

Macroeconomic Dynamics Near the ZLB: A Tale of Two Countries *

S. Boragan Aruoba

University of Maryland

Pablo Cuba-Borda

University of Maryland

Frank Schorfheide

University of Pennsylvania

CEPR and NBER

First Version: September 10, 2012

Current Version: June 19, 2014

Abstract

We propose and solve a small-scale New-Keynesian model with Markov sunspot shocks that move the economy between a targeted-inflation regime and a deflation regime and fit it to data from the U.S. and Japan. For the U.S. we find that adverse demand shocks have moved the economy to the zero lower bound (ZLB) in 2009 and an expansive monetary policy has kept it there subsequently. In contrast, Japan has experienced a switch to the deflation regime in 1999 and remained there since then, except for a short period. The two scenarios have drastically different implications for macroeconomic policies. Fiscal multipliers are about 20% smaller in the deflationary regime, despite the economy remaining at the ZLB. While a commitment by the central bank to keep rates near the ZLB doubles the fiscal multipliers in the targeted-inflation regime (U.S.), it has no effect in the deflation regime (Japan).

JEL CLASSIFICATION: C5, E4, E5

KEY WORDS: DSGE Models, Government Spending Multiplier, Japan, Multiple Equilibria, Nonlinear Filtering, Nonlinear Solution Methods, Sunspots, U.S., ZLB

* Correspondence: B. Aruoba: Department of Economics, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742. Email: aruoba@econ.umd.edu. F. Schorfheide: Department of Economics, 3718 Locust Walk, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104. Email: schorf@ssc.upenn.edu. This paper previously circulated under the title "Macroeconomic Dynamics Near the ZLB: A Tale of Two Equilibria". We are thankful for helpful comments and suggestions from Saroj Bhattarai, Jeff Campbell, Hiroshi Fujiki, Hidehiko Matsumoto, Karel Mertens, Morten Ravn, Stephanie Schmitt-Grohe, Mike Woodford, and seminar participants at the 2012 Princeton Conference in Honor of Chris Sims, the Bank of Italy, the 2013 Bank of England - LSE Conference, the 2014 AEA Meetings, the Board of Governors, Boston College, the Federal Reserve Banks of Chicago, Kansas City, New York, Philadelphia, and Richmond, the National Bank of Belgium, Texas A&M University, UC San Diego, University of Maryland, University of Pennsylvania, and UQAM. Much of this paper was written while Aruoba and Schorfheide visited the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, whose hospitality they are thankful for. The authors gratefully acknowledge financial support from the National Science Foundation under Grant SES 1061725.

1 Introduction

Japan has experienced near-zero interest rates since 1995 and in the U.S. the federal funds rate dropped below 20 basis points in December 2008 and has stayed near zero in the aftermath of the Great Recession. Simultaneously, Japan experienced a deflation of about 1% per year. Investors' access to money, which yields a zero nominal return, prevents interest rates from falling below zero and thereby creates a zero lower bound (ZLB) for nominal interest rates. The ZLB is of great concern to policy makers because if an economy is at the ZLB, the central bank is unable to stimulate the economy or react to deflation using a conventional monetary policy that reduces interest rates.

One prominent explanation for the prolonged spell of zero interest rates and deflation in Japan since the late 1990s is that the economy moved toward an undesirable or unintended steady state. Once the ZLB is explicitly included in a standard New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with an interest-rate feedback rule, there are typically two steady states. In the targeted-inflation steady state inflation equals the value targeted by the central bank and nominal interest rates are strictly positive. In the second steady state, the deflation steady state, nominal interest rates are zero and inflation rates are negative. Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe (2001a) were the first to study equilibria in which an economy transitions from the neighborhood of the targeted-inflation steady state to the undesirable deflation steady state.

While *ex post* the U.S. did not experience an extended period of deflation, a potential switch to a deflation regime that resembles the economic experience of Japan was a real concern to U.S. policy makers. For instance, the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, James Bullard in Bullard (2010), was talking about various shocks, some of which may possibly be actions or announcements by the Federal Reserve, leading the U.S. economy to settle near the deflation steady state:

During this recovery, the U.S. economy is susceptible to negative shocks that may dampen inflation expectations. This could push the economy into an unintended, low nominal interest rate steady state. Escape from such an outcome

is problematic. [...] The United States is closer to a Japanese-style outcome today than at any time in recent history. [...] Promising to remain at zero for a long time is a double-edged sword. The policy is consistent with the idea that inflation and inflation expectations should rise in response to the promise and that this will eventually lead the economy back toward the targeted equilibrium. But the policy is also consistent with the idea that inflation and inflation expectations will instead fall and that the economy will settle in the neighborhood of the unintended steady state, as Japan has in recent years.

The key contribution of our paper is to provide a formal econometric analysis of the likelihood that Japan and the U.S. shifted to a regime that can be described by fluctuations around a deflation steady state in a standard New Keynesian DSGE model. While many authors have suggested that Japan's experience resembles the outcomes predicted by the deflation steady state, to the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to provide a full-fledged econometric assessment of this hypothesis. We construct a sunspot equilibrium for an estimated small-scale New Keynesian DSGE model with an explicit ZLB constraint, in which a sunspot shock can move the economy from a targeted-inflation regime to a deflation regime. While this sunspot shock is formally exogenous in our model, we offer an informal interpretation according to which agents coordinate their expectations and actions based on the central bank's statements about the stance of monetary policy. Our paper also makes an important technical contribution: it is the first paper to use global projection methods to compute a sunspot equilibrium for a DSGE model with a full set of stochastic shocks that can be used to track macroeconomic time series.

We estimate our model based on U.S. and Japanese data on output growth, inflation, and interest rates, using observations that pre-date the episodes of zero nominal interest rates. Conditioning on these parameter estimates, we use a nonlinear filter to extract the sequence of shocks that can explain the data. Most importantly, we obtain estimates of the probability that the economies were in either the targeted-inflation or the deflation regime. We find that the U.S. and Japanese ZLB experiences were markedly different: Japan shifted from the targeted-inflation regime into the deflation regime in the second quarter of 1999. From an

econometric perspective, our sunspot model fits the Japanese data remarkably well. Despite the simplicity of our DSGE model's structure the filtered shock innovations are by and large consistent with the probabilistic assumptions of independence and normality underlying the model specification. The U.S. on the other hand, remained in the targeted-inflation regime throughout our sample period. It experienced a sequence of bad shocks during the Great Recession that pushed interest rates toward zero, followed by an expansionary monetary policy that has kept interest rates at zero since then. The large shocks necessary to capture the Great Recession are highly unlikely under the probabilistic structure of the model, which is a common problem for DSGE models with Gaussian innovations.

To illustrate the consequences of being in either regime, we conduct a sequence of expansionary fiscal policy experiments, conditioning on states that are associated with the ZLB episodes in the U.S. and Japan, and compare the outcomes of these policies in the two countries. The two regimes have drastically different implications for macroeconomic policies. Fiscal multipliers are about 20% smaller in the deflationary regime, despite the economy remaining at the ZLB. While a commitment by the central bank to keep rates near the ZLB doubles the fiscal multipliers in the targeted-inflation regime (U.S.), it has no effect in the deflation regime (Japan).

Our paper is related to the four strands of the literature: sunspots and multiplicity of equilibria in New Keynesian DSGE models; global projection methods for the solution of DSGE models; the use of particle filters to extract hidden states based on nonlinear state-space models; and the size of government spending multipliers at the ZLB.

The relevance of sunspots in economic models was first discussed in Cass and Shell (1983), who define sunspots as “extrinsic uncertainty, that is, random phenomena that do not affect tastes, endowments, or production possibilities.” Sunspot shocks can affect economic outcomes in environments in which there does not exist a unique equilibrium. Multiplicity of equilibria in New Keynesian DSGE models arises for two reasons. First, a passive monetary policy – meaning that in response to a one percent deviation of inflation from its target the central bank raises nominal interest rates by less than one percent – can generate local indeterminacy in the neighborhood of a steady state. An econometric analysis of this type of

multiplicity is provided by Lubik and Schorfheide (2004). Second, the kink in the monetary policy rule induced by the ZLB generates a second steady-state in which nominal interest rates are zero and inflation rates are negative. Because in the neighborhood of this second steady state the central bank is unable to lower interest rates in response to a drop in inflation, the local dynamics are indeterminate. As a result it is generally possible to construct a large number of equilibria in New Keynesian DSGE models. Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe (2001a,b) were the first to construct equilibria in which the economy transitions from the targeted-inflation steady state toward the deflation steady state. More recently, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2012) study an equilibrium in which confidence shocks combined with downward nominal wage rigidity can deliver jobless recoveries near the ZLB in a mostly analytical analysis. Cochrane (2013) abstracts from the existence of the deflationary steady state and constructs multiple liquidity trap equilibria by assuming that after exiting the ZLB monetary policy remains passive and exploiting the resulting local indeterminacy. Armenter (2014) considers the multiplicity of Markov equilibria in a model in which monetary policy is not represented by a Taylor rule but it is optimally chosen to maximize social welfare.

Our paper focuses on an equilibrium in which a Markov-switching sunspot shock moves the economy from the vicinity of one steady state to the vicinity of the other steady state. This equilibrium allows us to provide a formal econometric assessment of whether Japan or the U.S. have shifted toward the deflation steady state during their respective ZLB episodes. Such a sunspot equilibrium has been recently analyzed by Mertens and Ravn (2014), but in a model with a much more restrictive exogenous shock structure. Our paper is the first to compute a sunspot equilibrium in a New Keynesian DSGE model that is rich enough to track macroeconomic time series and to use a filter to extract the evolution of the hidden sunspot shock.

In terms of solution method, our work is most closely related to the papers by Judd, Maliar, and Maliar (2010), Maliar and Maliar (2014), Fernández-Villaverde, Gordon, Guerrón-Quintana, and Rubio-Ramírez (2012), and Gust, Lopez-Salido, and Smith (2012).¹ All of

¹Most of the other papers that study DSGE models with a ZLB constraint take various shortcuts to solve the model. In particular, following Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), many authors assume that an exogenous Markov-switching process pushes the economy to the ZLB. The subsequent exit from the ZLB

these papers use global projection methods to approximate agents' decision rules in a New Keynesian DSGE model with a ZLB constraint. However, these papers solely consider an equilibrium in which the economy is always in the targeted-inflation regime – what we could call a targeted-inflation equilibrium –, and some details of the implementation of the solution algorithm are different.

To improve the accuracy of the model solution, we introduce two novel features. First, we use a piece-wise smooth approximation with two separate functions characterizing the decisions when the ZLB is binding and when it is not. This means all our decision rules allow for kinks at points in the state space where the ZLB becomes binding. Second, when constructing a grid of points in the models' state space for which the equilibrium conditions are explicitly evaluated by the projection approach, we combine draws from the ergodic distribution of the DSGE model with values of the state variables obtained by applying our filtering procedure. Our modification of the ergodic-set method proposed by Judd, Maliar, and Maliar (2010) ensures that the model solution is accurate in a region of the state space that is unlikely *ex ante* under the ergodic distribution of the model, but very important *ex post* to explain the observed data. This modification turns out to be very important when solving a model tailored to fit U.S. data.

With respect to the empirical analysis, the only other paper that combines a projection solution with a nonlinear filter to track U.S. data throughout the Great Recession period to extract estimates of the fundamental shocks is Gust, Lopez-Salido, and Smith (2012). However, their empirical analysis is restricted to the targeted-inflation equilibrium and focuses on the extent to which the ZLB constrained the ability of monetary policy to stabilize the economy. Moreover, ours is the first paper to use a nonlinear DSGE model with an explicit ZLB constraint to study the ZLB experience of Japan.

The effect of an increase in government spending when the economy is at the ZLB has

is exogenous and occurs with a prespecified probability. The absence of other shocks makes it impossible to use the model to track actual data. Unfortunately, model properties tend to be very sensitive to the approximation technique and to implicit or explicit assumptions about the probability of leaving the ZLB, see Braun, Körber, and Waki (2012) and Fernández-Villaverde, Gordon, Guerrón-Quintana, and Rubio-Ramírez (2012).

been studied by Braun, Körber, and Waki (2012), Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2011), Fernández-Villaverde, Gordon, Guerrón-Quintana, and Rubio-Ramírez (2012), Eggertsson (2009), and Mertens and Ravn (2014). Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2011) argue that the fiscal multiplier at the ZLB can be substantially larger than one. In general, the government spending multiplier crucially depends on whether the expansionary fiscal policy triggers an exit from the ZLB. The longer the exit from the ZLB is delayed, the larger the government spending multiplier. Mertens and Ravn (2014) emphasize that in what we would call a deflation equilibrium, the effects of expansionary government spending can be substantially smaller from the effects in the standard targeted-inflation equilibrium.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple two-equation model that we use to illustrate the multiplicity of equilibria in monetary models with ZLB constraints. We also highlight the types of equilibria studied in this paper. The New Keynesian model that is used for the quantitative analysis is presented in Section 3, and the solution of the model is discussed in Section 4. Section 5 contains the quantitative analysis, and Section 6 concludes. Detailed derivations, descriptions of algorithms, and additional quantitative results are summarized in an Online Appendix.

2 A Two-Equation Example

We begin with a simple two-equation example to characterize the sunspot equilibrium that we will study in the remainder of this paper in the context of a New Keynesian DSGE model with interest-rate feedback rule and ZLB constraint. The example is adapted from Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe (2001a) and Hursey and Wolman (2010). Suppose that the economy can be described by the Fisher relationship

$$R_t = r\mathbb{E}_t[\pi_{t+1}] \quad (1)$$

and the monetary policy rule

$$R_t = \max \left\{ 1, r\pi_* \left(\frac{\pi_t}{\pi_*} \right)^\psi \exp[\sigma\epsilon_t] \right\}, \quad \epsilon_t \sim iidN(0, 1), \quad \psi > 1. \quad (2)$$

Here R_t denotes the gross nominal interest rate, π_t is the gross inflation rate, and ϵ_t is a monetary policy shock. The gross nominal interest rate is bounded from below by one. Throughout this paper we refer to this bound as the ZLB because it bounds the net interest rate from below by zero. Combining (1) and (2) yields a nonlinear expectational difference equation for inflation

$$\mathbb{E}_t[\pi_{t+1}] = \max \left\{ \frac{1}{r}, \pi_* \left(\frac{\pi_t}{\pi_*} \right)^\psi \exp[\sigma \epsilon_t] \right\}. \quad (3)$$

This model has two steady states ($\sigma = 0$), which we call the targeted-inflation steady state and the deflation steady state, respectively. In the targeted-inflation steady state, inflation equals π_* , and the nominal interest rate is $R = r\pi_*$. In the deflation steady state, inflation equals $\pi_D = 1/r$, and the nominal interest is $R_D = 1$.

The presence of two steady states suggests that the nonlinear rational expectation difference equation (3) has multiple stable stochastic solutions. We find solutions to this equation using a guess-and-verify approach. A solution that fluctuates around the targeted-inflation steady state is given by

$$\pi_t^{(*)} = \pi_* \gamma_* \exp \left[-\frac{1}{\psi} \sigma \epsilon_t \right], \quad \gamma_* = \exp \left[\frac{\sigma^2}{2(\psi - 1)\psi^2} \right]. \quad (4)$$

We can also obtain a solution that fluctuates around the deflation steady state:

$$\pi_t^{(D)} = \pi_* \gamma_D \exp \left[-\frac{1}{\psi} \sigma \epsilon_t \right], \quad \gamma_D = \frac{1}{\pi_* r} \exp \left[-\frac{\sigma^2}{2\psi^2} \right]. \quad (5)$$



This second solution differs from (4) only with respect to the constant γ_D , and has the same dynamics. We refer to $\pi_t^{(*)}$ as the targeted-inflation equilibrium and $\pi_t^{(D)}$ as the deflation equilibrium associated with (3).²

In the remainder of the paper we will focus on an equilibrium in which a two-state Markov-switching sunspot shock $s_t \in \{0, 1\}$ triggers moves from a targeted-inflation regime to a deflation regime and vice versa:

$$\pi_t^{(s)} = \pi_* \gamma(s_t) \exp \left[-\frac{1}{\psi} \sigma \epsilon_t \right]. \quad (6)$$

²There can be other equilibria similar to (5) where the economy spends time around the deflation steady state. Some of these can be simply constructed using (5) by changing the dynamics in the region where the ZLB binds. See Appendix A for an example.

Figure 1: Inflation Dynamics in the Two-Equation Model

Targeted-Inflation and Deflation Equilibria**Sunspot Equilibrium**

Notes: In the left panel, the blue line shows the targeted-inflation equilibrium, and the red line shows the deflation equilibrium. In the right panel, the shaded area corresponds to periods in which the system is in the deflation regime.

The constants $\gamma(0)$ and $\gamma(1)$ are similar in magnitude (but not identical) to γ_* and γ_D in (4) and (5), respectively. The precise values depend on the transition probabilities of the Markov switching process and ensure that (3) holds in every period t . The fluctuations of $\pi_t^{(s)}$ around $\pi_*\gamma(s_t)$ are identical to the fluctuations in the above targeted-inflation and deflation equilibria. Throughout this paper, we will assume that the sunspot process evolves independently from the fundamental shocks.³ A numerical illustration is provided in Figure 1. The left panel compares the paths of net inflation under the targeted-inflation equilibrium (4) and the deflation equilibrium (5). The difference between the inflation paths is the level shift due to the constants γ_* versus γ_D . The right panel shows the sunspot equilibrium with visible shifts from the targeted-inflation regime to the deflation regime (shaded areas) and back.

There exist many other solutions to (3). The local dynamics around the deflation steady state, ignoring the ZLB constraint, are indeterminate, and it is possible to find alternative deflation equilibria. For example, Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe (2001a) studies alternative equilibria in which the economy transitions from the targeted-inflation regime

³For the simple example in this section we can easily construct equilibria in which the Markov transition is triggered by ϵ_t .

to a deflation regime and remains in the deflation regime permanently in continuous-time perfect foresight monetary models. Such equilibria can also be constructed in our model, and one of them is discussed in more detail in Appendix A.

3 A Prototypical New Keynesian DSGE Model

Our quantitative analysis will be based on a small-scale New Keynesian DSGE model. Variants of this model have been widely studied in the literature and its properties are discussed in detail in Woodford (2003). The model economy consists of perfectly competitive final-goods-producing firms, a continuum of monopolistically competitive intermediate goods producers, a continuum of identical households, and a government that engages in active monetary and passive fiscal policy. To keep the dimension of the state space manageable, we abstract from capital accumulation and wage rigidities. We describe the preferences and technologies of the agents in Section 3.1, and summarize the equilibrium conditions in Section 3.2.

3.1 Preferences and Technologies

Households. Households derive utility from consumption C_t relative to an exogenous habit stock and disutility from hours worked H_t . We assume that the habit stock is given by the level of technology A_t , which ensures that the economy evolves along a balanced growth path. We also assume that the households value transaction services from real money balances, detrended by A_t , and include them in the utility function. The households maximize

$$\mathbb{E}_t \left[\sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \beta^s \left(\frac{(C_{t+s}/A_{t+s})^{1-\tau} - 1}{1-\tau} - \chi_H \frac{H_{t+s}^{1+1/\eta}}{1+1/\eta} + \chi_M V \left(\frac{M_{t+s}}{P_{t+s}A_{t+s}} \right) \right) \right], \quad (7)$$

subject to budget constraint

$$P_t C_t + T_t + M_t + B_t = P_t W_t H_t + M_{t-1} + R_{t-1} B_{t-1} + P_t D_t + P_t S C_t.$$

Here β is the discount factor, $1/\tau$ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, η is the Frisch labor supply elasticity, and P_t is the price of the final good. The households

supply labor services to the firms, taking the real wage W_t as given. At the end of period t , households hold money in the amount of M_t . They have access to a bond market where nominal government bonds B_t that pay gross interest R_t are traded. Furthermore, the households receive profits D_t from the firms and pay lump-sum taxes T_t . SC_t is the net cash inflow from trading a full set of state-contingent securities.

Detrended real money balances $M_t/(P_t A_t)$ enter the utility function in an additively separable fashion. An empirical justification of this assumption is provided by Ireland (2004). As a consequence, the equilibrium has a block diagonal structure under the interest-rate feedback rule that we will specify below: the level of output, inflation, and interest rates can be determined independently of the money stock. We assume that the marginal utility $V'(m)$ is decreasing in real money balances m and reaches zero for $m = \bar{m}$, which is the amount of money held in steady state by households if the net nominal interest rate is zero. Since the return on holding money is zero, it provides the rationale for the ZLB on nominal rates. The usual transversality condition on asset accumulation applies.

Firms. The final-goods producers aggregate intermediate goods, indexed by $j \in [0, 1]$, using the technology:

$$Y_t = \left(\int_0^1 Y_t(j)^{1-\nu} dj \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\nu}}.$$

The firms take input prices $P_t(j)$ and output prices P_t as given. Profit maximization implies that the demand for inputs is given by

$$Y_t(j) = \left(\frac{P_t(j)}{P_t} \right)^{-1/\nu} Y_t.$$

Under the assumption of free entry into the final-goods market, profits are zero in equilibrium, and the price of the aggregate good is given by

$$P_t = \left(\int_0^1 P_t(j)^{\frac{\nu-1}{\nu}} dj \right)^{\frac{\nu}{\nu-1}}. \quad (8)$$

We define inflation as $\pi_t = P_t/P_{t-1}$.

Intermediate good j is produced by a monopolist who has access to the following production technology:

$$Y_t(j) = A_t H_t(j), \quad (9)$$

where A_t is an exogenous productivity process that is common to all firms and $H_t(j)$ is the firm-specific labor input. Labor is hired in a perfectly competitive factor market at the real wage W_t . Intermediate-goods-producing firms face quadratic price adjustment costs of the form

$$AC_t(j) = \frac{\phi}{2} \left(\frac{P_t(j)}{P_{t-1}(j)} - \bar{\pi} \right)^2 Y_t(j),$$

where ϕ governs the price stickiness in the economy and $\bar{\pi}$ is a baseline rate of price change that does not require the payment of any adjustment costs. In our quantitative analysis, we set $\bar{\pi} = 1$, that is, it is costless to keep prices constant. Firm j chooses its labor input $H_t(j)$ and the price $P_t(j)$ to maximize the present value of future profits

$$\mathbb{E}_t \left[\sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \beta^s Q_{t+s|t} \left(\frac{P_{t+s}(j)}{P_{t+s}} Y_{t+s}(j) - W_{t+s} H_{t+s}(j) - AC_{t+s} \right) \right]. \quad (10)$$

Here, $Q_{t+s|t}$ is the time t value to the household of a unit of the consumption good in period $t + s$, which is treated as exogenous by the firm.

Government Policies. Monetary policy is described by an interest rate feedback rule of the form

$$R_t = \max \left\{ 1, \left[r \pi_* \left(\frac{\pi_t}{\pi_*} \right)^{\psi_1} \left(\frac{Y_t}{\gamma Y_{t-1}} \right)^{\psi_2} \right]^{1-\rho_R} R_{t-1}^{\rho_R} e^{\sigma_{R,t}} \right\}. \quad (11)$$

Here r is the steady-state real interest rate, π_* is the target-inflation rate, and $\epsilon_{R,t}$ is a monetary policy shock. The key departure from much of the New Keynesian DSGE literature is the use of the max operator to enforce the ZLB. Provided that the ZLB is not binding, the central bank reacts to deviations of inflation from the target rate π_* and deviations of output growth from its long-run value γ .

The government consumes a stochastic fraction of aggregate output and government spending evolves according to

$$G_t = \left(1 - \frac{1}{g_t} \right) Y_t. \quad (12)$$

The government levies a lump-sum tax T_t (or provides a subsidy if T_t is negative) to finance any shortfalls in government revenues (or to rebate any surplus). Its budget constraint is given by

$$P_t G_t + M_{t-1} + R_{t-1} B_{t-1} = T_t + M_t + B_t. \quad (13)$$

Exogenous shocks. The model economy is perturbed by three (fundamental) exogenous processes. Aggregate productivity evolves according to

$$\ln A_t = \ln \gamma + \ln A_{t-1} + \ln z_t, \text{ where } \ln z_t = \rho_z \ln z_{t-1} + \sigma_z \epsilon_{z,t}. \quad (14)$$

Thus, on average, the economy grows at the rate γ , and z_t generates exogenous fluctuations of the technology growth rate. We assume that the government spending shock follows the AR(1) law of motion

$$\ln g_t = (1 - \rho_g) \ln g_* + \rho_g \ln g_{t-1} + \sigma_g \epsilon_{g,t}. \quad (15)$$

While we formally introduce the exogenous process g_t as a government spending shock, we interpret it more broadly as an exogenous demand shock that contributes to fluctuations in output. The monetary policy shock $\epsilon_{R,t}$ is assumed to be serially uncorrelated. We stack the three innovations into the vector $\epsilon_t = [\epsilon_{z,t}, \epsilon_{g,t}, \epsilon_{r,t}]'$ and assume that $\epsilon_t \sim iidN(0, I)$.⁴ In addition to the fundamental shock processes, agents in the model economy observe an exogenous sunspot shock s_t , which follows a two-state Markov-switching process

$$\mathbb{P}\{s_t = 1\} = \begin{cases} (1 - p_{00}) & \text{if } s_{t-1} = 0 \\ p_{11} & \text{if } s_{t-1} = 1 \end{cases}. \quad (16)$$

3.2 Equilibrium Conditions

Since the exogenous productivity process has a stochastic trend, it is convenient to characterize the equilibrium conditions of the model economy in terms of detrended consumption $c_t \equiv C_t/A_t$ and detrended output $y_t \equiv Y_t/A_t$. Also, we define

$$\mathcal{E}_t \equiv \mathbb{E}_t \left[\frac{c_{t+1}^{-\tau}}{\gamma z_{t+1} \pi_{t+1}} \right] \quad (17)$$

$$\xi(c, \pi, y) \equiv c^{-\tau} y \left\{ \frac{1}{\nu} (1 - \chi_h c^\tau y^{1/\eta}) + \phi(\pi - \bar{\pi}) \left[\left(1 - \frac{1}{2\nu}\right) \pi + \frac{\bar{\pi}}{2\nu} \right] - 1 \right\}, \quad (18)$$

⁴Unlike some of the other papers in the ZLB literature, e.g. Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2011) and Fernández-Villaverde, Gordon, Guerrón-Quintana, and Rubio-Ramírez (2012), we do not include a discount factor shock in the model. We follow the strand of the literature that has estimated three-equation DSGE models that are driven by a technology shock, a demand (government spending), and a monetary policy shock and has documented that such models fit U.S. data for output growth, inflation, and interest rates reasonably well before the Great Recession.

which will be useful in the computational algorithm. A detailed derivation of the equilibrium conditions is provided in Appendix B. The consumption Euler equation is given by

$$c_t^{-\tau} = \beta R_t \mathcal{E}_t. \quad (19)$$

In a symmetric equilibrium, in which all firms set the same price $P_t(j)$, the price-setting decision of the firms leads to the condition

$$\xi(c_t, \pi_t, y_t) = \phi \beta \mathbf{E}_t [c_{t+1}^{-\tau} y_{t+1} (\pi_{t+1} - \bar{\pi}) \pi_{t+1}] \quad (20)$$

The aggregate resource constraint can be expressed as

$$c_t = \left[\frac{1}{g_t} - \frac{\phi}{2} (\pi_t - \bar{\pi})^2 \right] y_t. \quad (21)$$

It reflects both government spending as well as the resource cost (in terms of output) caused by price changes. Finally, we reproduce the monetary policy rule

$$R_t = \max \left\{ 1, \left[r \pi_* \left(\frac{\pi_t}{\pi_*} \right)^{\psi_1} \left(\frac{y_t}{y_{t-1}} z_t \right)^{\psi_2} \right]^{1-\rho_R} R_{t-1}^{\rho_R} e^{\sigma_R \epsilon_{R,t}} \right\}. \quad (22)$$

We do not use a measure of money in our empirical analysis and therefore drop the equilibrium condition that determines money demand.

As the two-equation model in Section 2, the New Keynesian model with the ZLB constraint has two steady states, which we refer to as the targeted-inflation and the deflation steady state. In the targeted-inflation steady state, inflation equals π_* and the gross interest rate equals $r\pi_*$, while in the deflation steady state, inflation equals $1/r$ and the interest rate equals one.

4 Solution Algorithm

We now discuss some key features of the algorithm that is used to solve the nonlinear DSGE model presented in the previous section. Additional details can be found in Appendix D.1. We utilize a global approximation following Judd (1992) where the decision rules are assumed

to be combinations of Chebyshev polynomials. The minimum set of state variables associated with our DSGE models is

$$\mathcal{S}_t = (R_{t-1}, y_{t-1}, g_t, z_t, \epsilon_{R,t}, s_t). \quad (23)$$


An (approximate) solution of the DSGE model is a set of decision rules $\pi_t = \pi(\mathcal{S}_t; \Theta)$, $\mathcal{E}_t = \mathcal{E}(\mathcal{S}_t; \Theta)$, $c_t = c(\mathcal{S}_t; \Theta)$, $y_t = y(\mathcal{S}_t; \Theta)$, and $R_t = R(\mathcal{S}_t; \Theta)$ that solve the nonlinear rational expectations system (17), (19), (20), (21), and (22), where $\Theta \equiv \{\Theta_i\}$ for $i = 1, \dots, N$ parameterize the decision rules. Note that conditional on $\pi(\mathcal{S}_t; \Theta)$ and $\mathcal{E}(\mathcal{S}_t; \Theta)$, equations (19), (21) and (22) determine $c(\mathcal{S}_t; \Theta)$, $y(\mathcal{S}_t; \Theta)$, and $R(\mathcal{S}_t; \Theta)$, and therefore these equations hold exactly.

The solution algorithm amounts to specifying a grid of points $\mathcal{G} = \{\mathcal{S}_1, \dots, \mathcal{S}_M\}$ in the model's state space and solving for Θ such that the sum of squared residuals associated with (17) and (20) are minimized for $\mathcal{S}_t \in \mathcal{G}$. There are three non-standard aspects of our solution method that we will now discuss in more detail: first, the piecewise smooth representation of the functions $\pi(\cdot; \Theta)$ and $\mathcal{E}(\cdot; \Theta)$; second, our iterative procedure of choosing grid points \mathcal{G} ; third our method of initializing Θ when constructing the decision rules for the sunspot equilibrium.

Piece-wise Smooth Decision Rules. We show in Appendix C that the solution to a simplified linearized version of our DSGE model entails piece-wise linear decision rules. While Chebyshev polynomials, which are smooth functions of the states, can in principle approximate functions with a kink, such approximations are quite inaccurate for low-order polynomials. Thus, unlike Judd, Maliar, and Maliar (2010), Fernández-Villaverde, Gordon, Guerrón-Quintana, and Rubio-Ramírez (2012) and Gust, Lopez-Salido, and Smith (2012), we use a piece-wise smooth approximation of the functions $\pi(\mathcal{S}_t)$ and $\mathcal{E}(\mathcal{S}_t)$ by postulating

$$\pi(\mathcal{S}_t; \Theta) = \begin{cases} f_\pi^1(\mathcal{S}_t; \Theta) & \text{if } s_t = 1 \text{ and } R(\mathcal{S}_t) > 1 \\ f_\pi^2(\mathcal{S}_t; \Theta) & \text{if } s_t = 1 \text{ and } R(\mathcal{S}_t) = 1 \\ f_\pi^3(\mathcal{S}_t; \Theta) & \text{if } s_t = 0 \text{ and } R(\mathcal{S}_t) > 1 \\ f_\pi^4(\mathcal{S}_t; \Theta) & \text{if } s_t = 0 \text{ and } R(\mathcal{S}_t) = 1 \end{cases} \quad (24)$$

Figure 2: Sample Decision Rules



Note: This figure shows the decision rules assuming parameter values $p_{11} = 1$ and $\eta = \infty$ (linear disutility of labor). The x-axis shows the state variable g , while the other state variables are fixed at $s_t = 1$, $R_{t-1} = 1$, $y_{t-1} = y_*$, $z = 0$, and $\epsilon_{R,t} = 0$.

and similarly for $\mathcal{E}(\mathcal{S}_t, \Theta)$, where the functions f_j^i are linear combinations of a complete set of Chebyshev polynomials up to fourth order. Our method is flexible enough to allow for a kink in all decision rules and not just R_t , which has a kink by its construction.

In our experience, the flexibility of the piece-wise smooth approximation yields more accurate decision rules, especially for inflation. Figure 2 shows a slice of the decision rules where we set $s_t = 1$, $R_{t-1} = 1$, $y_{t-1} = y_*$, $z = 0$, and $\epsilon_{R,t} = 0$ and vary g_t in a wide range. The solid blue decision rules are based on the piece-wise smooth approximation

in (24), whereas the dashed red decision rules are obtained using a single set of Chebyshev polynomials, which impose smoothness on all decision rules except for $R(\mathcal{S}_t, \Theta)$. When approximated smoothly, the decision rules fail to capture the kinks that are apparent in the piece-wise smooth approximation. For instance, the decision rule for output illustrates that the (marginal) government-spending multiplier is sensitive to the ZLB – it is noticeably larger in the area of the state space where the ZLB binds – and the decision rule for inflation shows a very significant change in slope, neither of which is captured by the smooth approximation.

Choice of Grid Points. With regard to the choice of grid points, projection methods that require the solution to be accurate on a fixed grid, e.g., a tensor product grid, become exceedingly difficult to implement as the number of state variables increases above three. While the Smolyak grid proposed by Krueger and Kubler (2004) can alleviate the curse of dimensionality to some extent, we build on recent work by Judd, Maliar, and Maliar (2010)⁵, with a significant modification: we combine simulated grid points (obtained using a time-separated-grid algorithm) with states obtained from the data using a nonlinear filter. While Japanese data between 1981 and 2013 can be comfortably explained by the ergodic distribution associated with the sunspot solution of the DSGE model, U.S. data since 2008 are much more difficult to reconcile with the DSGE model. For the U.S., one needs shocks that are several standard deviations away from the center of the ergodic distribution to reach the ZLB in 2009. Thus, it is crucial to combine draws from the ergodic distribution with states that are extracted from data on output growth, inflation, and interest rates to generate the grid \mathcal{G} . This ensures that our approximation remains accurate in the area of the state space that is relevant for the empirical analysis. This is an iterative process. For a given solution given by Θ , we simulate the model and get a set of points that characterize the ergodic distribution. Then we run a particle filter, details of which are provided in

⁵The work by Judd, Maliar, and Maliar evolved considerably over time. We initially built on the working paper version, Judd, Maliar, and Maliar (2010), which proposed to simulate the model to be solved, to distinguish clusters on the simulated series, and to use the clusters' centers as a grid for projections. In the published version of the paper, Maliar and Maliar (2014), also consider ϵ -distinguishable (EDS) grids and locally-adaptive EDS grids. Their locally-adaptive grids are similar in spirit to our approach, which tries to control accuracy in a region of the state space that is important for the substantive analysis, even if it is far in the tails of the ergodic distribution.

Section 5.4, to obtain the grid points which are consistent with the U.S. data since 2008.

Initialization of Θ . Recall that the sunspot equilibrium decision rules are obtained by solving for Θ that minimizes the sum of squared residuals associated with (17) and (20) for $\mathcal{S}_t \in \mathcal{G}$. We start the solution process by solving the model assuming $p_{11} = p_{00} = 1$, that is, both sunspot regimes are absorbing states. This means, essentially, the decision rules evaluated at $s_t = 1$ ($s_t = 0$) resemble those that would be obtained in the targeted-inflation equilibrium (a minimal-state-variable deflation equilibrium). Once these decision rules are accurately obtained, after some iterations of the simulate-filter-solve algorithm, we use them as initial guesses of the decision rules of the full model with $p_{11} < 1$ and $p_{00} < 1$. When the transition probabilities are nonzero, the agents anticipate regime changes to occur in the future and this changes their decision rules. Still the initial guesses prove to be reasonably accurate.⁶ We parameterize each f_j^i for $i = 1, \dots, 4$ and $j = \pi, \mathcal{E}$ with 126 parameters for a total of 1,008 elements in Θ and use $M = 624$ including the grid points from the ergodic distribution and the filtered states. For a given set of filtered states and simulated grid, the solution takes about two minutes on a single-core Windows-based computer using MATLAB. The approximation errors are in the order of 10^{-4} or smaller, expressed in consumption units.

5 Quantitative Analysis

The data sets used in the empirical analysis are described in Section 5.1. In Section 5.2, we estimate the parameters of the DSGE model for the U.S. and Japan using data from before the economies reached the ZLB. These parameter estimates are the starting point for the subsequent analysis. In Section 5.3, we compare the ergodic distributions of interest rates and inflation under the parameter estimates obtained for the two countries. In Section 5.4 we show that the Japanese economy shifted to the deflation regime at the end of the 1990s which triggered a long spell of zero nominal interest rates. The U.S., on the other hand, stayed in the targeted-inflation regime after 2009 when interest rates reached the ZLB.

⁶We do the filtering iteration three times and within each iteration we do the simulation-solve iteration five times. Further iterations do not change the results in any appreciable way.

Adverse demand shocks contributed to the low interest rates initially, and subsequently an expansionary monetary policy kept interest rates at zero. We offer an interpretation of the evolution of the estimated sunspot shocks in Section 5.5. Finally, Section 5.6 compares the effects of an expansionary fiscal policy in the U.S. and Japan.


5.1 Data

The subsequent empirical analysis is based on real per-capita GDP growth, GDP deflator inflation, and interest data for the U.S. and Japan. The U.S. interest rate is the federal funds rate and for Japan we use the Bank of Japan's uncollateralized call rate. Further details about the data are provided in Appendix E. The time series are plotted in Figure 3. The U.S. sample starts in 1984:Q1, after the start of the Great Moderation, whereas the time series for Japan start in 1981:Q1. The vertical lines denote the end of the estimation sample, which is 2007:Q4 for the U.S. and 1994:Q4 for Japan. We chose the endpoints for the estimation sample such that the economies are unambiguously in the targeted-inflation regime and away from the ZLB during the estimation period. For the U.S. the fourth quarter of 2007 marks the beginning of the Great Recession, which was followed with a long-lasting spell of zero interest rate starting in 2009. In Japan, short-term interest rates dropped below 50 basis points in 1995:Q4 and have stayed at or near zero ever since. A key feature of the deflation regime in our model is that inflation rates are negative. While the U.S. experienced only two quarters of negative inflation (2009:Q2 and Q3) and two quarters of inflation around 0.5% (2011:Q4 and 2013:Q2), inflation in Japan has been negative (or near zero) for most quarters since 1995. These features of the data are important for the identification of the sunspot regimes.

5.2 Model Estimation

We verified that the decision rules for the targeted-inflation regime in the region of the state space for which the ZLB is far from being binding, are well approximated by the decision rules obtained from a second-order perturbation solution of the DSGE model that ignores

Figure 3: Data



Note: See Section 5.1 for the data definitions. The vertical red line in each figure show the end of the estimation sample. The yellow shading is explained in Section 5.4 and it shows the periods during which $\mathbb{P}\{s_t = 1\} | Y_{1:t} < 0.1$ as assessed by the nonlinear filter.

the ZLB. Because the perturbation solution is much easier to compute and numerically more stable than the global approximation to the sunspot equilibrium discussed in Section 4, we end the estimation samples for the U.S. and Japan in 2007:Q4 and 1994:Q4, respectively. To obtain posterior estimates of the DSGE model parameters we use a particle Markov chain Monte Carlo approach along the lines of Fernández-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramírez (2007) and Andrieu, Doucet, and Holenstein (2010), which approximates the likelihood function with a particle filter and embeds that approximation into a Metropolis-Hastings sampler.

The parameter estimates are in Table 1.⁷ A subset of the parameters were fixed prior to

⁷The prior distribution as well as the implementation of the posterior sampler are described in Ap-

Table 1: DSGE Model Parameters

Parameters	Description	1984:Q1-2007:Q4		1981:Q1-1994:Q4	
		U.S.		Japan	
τ	Inverse IES	2.23	(1.85, 2.66)	1.14	(0.72, 1.70)
κ	Slope (linearized) Phillips curve	0.26	(0.16, 0.39)	0.55	(0.36, 0.77)
ψ_1	Taylor rule: weight on inflation	1.52	(1.45, 1.60)	1.49	(1.41, 1.58)
ρ_R	Interest rate smoothing	0.59	(0.51, 0.68)	0.6	(0.47, 0.71)
ρ_g	Persistence: demand shock	0.92	(0.88, 0.94)	0.88	(0.82, 0.94)
ρ_z	Persistence: technology shock	0.16	(0.05, 0.30)	0.04	(0.01, 0.09)
$100\sigma_R$	Std dev: monetary policy shock	0.23	(0.18, 0.30)	0.23	(0.17, 0.30)
$100\sigma_g$	Std dev: demand shock	0.54	(0.41, 0.70)	1.02	(0.71, 1.51)
$100\sigma_z$	Std dev: technology shock	0.54	(0.44, 0.66)	1.02	(0.82, 1.26)
The Following Parameters Were Fixed During Estimation					
$100 \ln \gamma$	Quarterly growth rate of technology	0.48		0.56	
$400(1 - 1/\beta)$	Annualized discount rate	0.87		1.88	
$400 \ln \pi^*$	Annualized inflation rate	2.52		1.28	
$(G/Y)_*$	SS consumption/output ratio	0.15		0.16	
η	Frisch elasticity	0.85		0.72	
ψ_2	Taylor rule: weight on output growth	0.80		0.30	
ν	EOS intermediate inputs	0.10		0.10	
p_{00}	Prob of staying in deflation regime	0.95		0.95	
p_{11}	Prob of staying in targeted-inflation regime	0.99		0.99	

Notes: We report posterior means and 90% credible intervals (5th and 95th percentile of the posterior distribution) in parentheses. EOS is elasticity of substitution; SS is steady state. Note that $g_* = 1/(1 - (G/Y)_*)$.

estimation. We choose values for γ , β , and π^* such that the steady state of the model matches the average output growth, inflation, and interest rates over the estimation sample period.⁸

pendix F.

⁸In a nonlinear model, the average of the ergodic distribution is generally different from the steady state. However, over the estimation period, the nonlinearities are not very strong and the discrepancy is small.

The steady state government expenditure-to-output ratio is determined from national accounts data. Since our sample does not include observations on labor market variables, we fix the Frisch labor supply elasticity. Based on Ríos-Rull, Schorfheide, Fuentes-Albero, Kryshko, and Santaaulalia-Llopis (2012), who provide a detailed discussion of parameter values that are appropriate for DSGE models of U.S. data, we set $\eta = 0.85$ for the U.S. Our value for Japan is based on Kuroda and Yamamoto (2008) who use micro-level data to estimate labor supply elasticities along the intensive and extensive for males and females. The authors report a range of values which we aggregated into $\eta = 0.72$.

We fix the value of ψ_2 based on estimates of linearized DSGE models with an output-growth rule.⁹ The parameter ν , which captures the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods, is set to 0.1. It is essentially not separately identifiable from the price adjustment cost parameter ϕ . Finally, we need to specify values for the transition probabilities p_{00} and p_{11} . These parameters determine the expected durations of staying in each regime. Since there is no clear empirical observation to identify the transition probabilities, we informally chose $p_{00} = 0.95$ and $p_{11} = 0.99$. These values make the deflation regime ($s_t = 0$) less persistent than the targeted-inflation regime ($s_t = 1$) and imply unconditional regime probabilities of 0.17 ($s_t = 0$) and 0.83 ($s_t = 1$), respectively.

For the remaining parameters, we report posterior mean estimates and 90% credible intervals in Table 1. Overall, the estimates reported in the table are in line with the estimates reported elsewhere in the literature. Most notable are the estimates of the degree of price rigidity. Rather than reporting estimates for the adjustment cost parameter ϕ , we report estimates for the implied slope of the New Keynesian Phillips curve in a linearized version of the DSGE model (without ZLB constraint). This transformation takes the form $\kappa = \tau(1 - \nu)/(\nu\pi_*^2\phi)$. The slope estimate is 0.26 for the U.S. and 0.55 for Japan, implying fairly flexible prices and relatively small real effects of unanticipated interest rate changes.¹⁰

⁹For Japan we use the average of the estimates from Ichiue, Kurozumi, and Sunakawa (2013) and Fujiwara, Hirose, and Shintani (2011), which are 0.50 and 0.17 respectively. For the US we use the estimate of Aruoba and Schorfheide (2013).

¹⁰A survey of DSGE model-based New Keynesian Phillips curve is provided in Schorfheide (2008). Our estimates fall within the range of the estimates obtained in the literature.


5.3 Equilibrium Dynamics

To understand how our model behaves at its ergodic distribution, we simulate a long sequence of draws using the estimates for both countries. Figure 4 depicts contour plots of the ergodic distributions of inflation and interest rates for the two countries in columns and for two regimes in rows. In the contour plots each line represents one percentile with the outermost line showing the 99th percentile. In each panel we show the data used to estimate the model using black stars and the post-estimation data using green stars. There are a number of noteworthy results. First, the ergodic distributions are centered near the respective steady state values with the mean inflation when $s = 1$ slightly below π_* and mean inflation when $s = 0$ below $1/r$. Second, focusing on the top row, the estimation data falls squarely inside the ergodic distributions for $s = 1$ with only a few observations with high interest rates for the U.S. Third, ZLB is not observed in the ergodic distribution for $s = 1$ for either country, while in about 85% of observations feature the ZLB when $s = 0$ for both countries. This is not surprising since the estimation samples of both countries cover a period of above-zero interest rates and low macroeconomic volatility. Finally, deflation is very unlikely in the U.S. when $s = 1$ with only a 1.1% probability, while in Japan this is much higher at 22.9%. When $s = 0$, on the other hand, inflation is never positive.

To provide more details about the ergodic distribution, annualized output growth is virtually identical across the two regimes for both countries. An important difference between the two regimes is the correlation of (detrended) output and inflation. When $s = 1$, this correlation is strongly positive – 0.83 for the U.S. and 0.73 for Japan – which is naturally consistent with the data, albeit somewhat stronger. When $s = 0$, on the other hand, the correlation becomes strongly negative, around -0.95 for both countries. This result is linked to the findings of Eggertsson (2009) and Mertens and Ravn (2014), who show that positive demand shocks may lead to a negative comovement of prices and output in the deflation regime.¹¹ Since the majority of fluctuations in our model is explained by the demand shock,

¹¹More specifically, Mertens and Ravn (2014) show that the EE curve, which plots inflation versus output using the relationship in (19) with necessary substitutions, has two segments, one downward sloping and one upward sloping. If the equilibrium is in the upward-sloping portion, then a positive demand shock may generate a decrease in inflation while increasing output.

Figure 4: Ergodic Distribution and Data



Notes: In each panel we report the joint probability density function (kernel density estimate) of annualized net interest rate and inflation, represented by the contours. Black stars show the data used in estimation. Green stars show the rest of the data.

this delivers the negative correlation.¹²

The focus of this paper is not normative, but it is worth mentioning that the deflationary regime is not necessarily “bad” in terms of welfare. Average consumption across the two regimes are identical and the volatility of consumption is 24% higher in the deflationary regime. The distance between actual and desired inflation (0%) is larger in the deflationary regime relative to the targeted-inflation regime, which means the adjustment costs will be larger. These observations would imply a lower welfare for the deflationary regime. However,

¹²We show impulse responses for the U.S. economy in Appendix G.

the interest rate is much closer, in fact most of the time exactly equal to zero (the Friedman rule) and thus the welfare cost due to holding money is much smaller. We leave a full-blown normative analysis along the lines of Aruoba and Schorfheide (2011) to future work.

5.4 Evidence For the Deflation Regime in the U.S. and Japan

The DSGE model has a nonlinear state-space representation of the form


$$\begin{aligned} d_t &= \Psi(x_t) + \nu_t \\ x_t &= F_{s_t}(x_{t-1}, \epsilon_t) \\ \mathbb{P}\{s_t = 1\} &= \begin{cases} (1 - p_{00}) & \text{if } s_{t-1} = 0 \\ p_{11} & \text{if } s_{t-1} = 1 \end{cases} \end{aligned} \quad (25)$$

Here d_t is the 3×1 vector of observables consisting of output growth, inflation, and nominal interest rates and $D_{1:t}$ is the sequence $\{d_1, \dots, d_t\}$. The vector x_t stacks the continuous state variables, which are given by $x_t = [R_t, y_t, y_{t-1}, z_t, g_t, A_t]'$, and $s_t \in \{0, 1\}$ is the Markov-switching process. The first equation in (25) is the measurement equation, where $\nu_t \sim N(0, \Sigma_\nu)$ is a vector of measurement errors. The second equation corresponds to the law of motion of the continuous state variables. The vector $\epsilon_t \sim N(0, I)$ stacks the innovations $\epsilon_{z,t}$, $\epsilon_{g,t}$, and $\epsilon_{R,t}$. The functions $F_0(\cdot)$ and $F_1(\cdot)$ are generated by the model solution procedure described in Section 4. The third equation represents the law of motion of the Markov-switching process. Conditioning on the posterior mean estimates obtained in Section 5.2, we now use a sequential Monte Carlo filter (also known as the particle filter)¹³ to extract estimates of the sunspot shock process s_t , and the latent state x_t .

The main result is presented in Figure 5, which depicts the filtered probabilities $\mathbb{P}[s_t = 1 | D_{1:t}]$ of being in the targeted-inflation regime. According to our estimates, the experience of the U.S. and Japan was markedly different. With the exception of 2011:Q4, when the probability of the deflation regime increased to about 70%, the U.S. has been in the targeted-inflation regime. In 2009:Q2, the probability of the deflation regime is small, but non-zero,

¹³This filter is a more elaborate version of the filter that underlies the estimation in Section 5.2. It is described in detail in Appendix H. A recent survey of sequential Monte Carlo methods is provided by Creal (2012).

Figure 5: Filtered Probability of Targeted-Inflation Regime



Notes: The solid red vertical bar indicates the end of the estimation sample. The shaded area indicates time periods for which the filtered probability for the targeted-inflation regime falls below 10%.

vindicating Bullard's (2010) concern of a shift to the deflationary regime. Japan, on the other hand, experienced a switch to the deflation regime in 1999:Q2, and, except for the period from 2008:Q4 to 2009:Q3, has stayed in the deflation regime.¹⁴ Recall from Figure 3 that the U.S. interest rates have been essentially zero since 2009:Q1, whereas in Japan interest rates have been below 50 basis points since 1995:Q4, and essentially zero since 1999:Q1. While in the case of the U.S. the ZLB spell is interpreted as evidence in favor of the targeted-inflation regime, for Japan it is attributed toward a shift into the deflation equilibrium. The key reason for this difference is the behavior of inflation. The U.S. experienced only three quarters of low or negative inflation rates, whereas prices have been on average falling for many years in Japan. The ergodic distributions depicted in Figure 4 highlight that the deflation regime not only implies that interest rates are close to zero, it also implies that inflation is negative with very high probability. Accordingly, it shows that none of the ZLB observations fall inside 99% of the ergodic distribution for the targeted-inflation regime for

¹⁴A large decline in oil prices lead to a decrease in the import deflator which in turn generated a large jump in the GDP deflator to about 6% in 2008:Q4. If we remove this observation, then the temporary switch to the targeted-inflation regime vanishes. If we use CPI instead of the GDP deflator as our price measure, we find a long spell of the deflation regime from 2000 to 2008 as well as a subsequent shorter spell.

either country, while about 70% of ZLB observations for Japan are well inside the ergodic distribution for the deflation regime.


In the absence of a switch to the deflation regime, the U.S. reaches the ZLB in response to very large negative innovations (greater than 2 standard deviations) to the latent demand shock process g_t . Since the DSGE model has a fairly strong mean reversion, a sequence of expansionary monetary policy shocks are necessary to prevent the nominal interest rate from rising. In the absence of these monetary policy shocks, U.S. nominal interest rates would have averaged 1.3% whereas average inflation would have been 0.4% instead of 1.6% after 2009. In Japan, the switch to the deflation regime pushed the economy toward the ZLB. While interest rates are close to zero in the deflation regime, Figure 4 shows that inflation rates should be less than -2.5% with very high probability. The average inflation rate between 1999 and 2008 is about -1.3%. The model rationalizes the relatively low observed deflation with a sequence of demand shock innovations that is on average slightly negative. Recall that in the deflation regime a negative $\epsilon_{g,t}$ tends to raise inflation.

5.5 Interpretation of Results

From the perspective of our model both the U.S. and the Japanese economy experienced a sequence of adverse demand shocks that lead to a fall in interest rates.¹⁵ In the U.S. it was the financial crisis that unfolded during 2008 and peaked in the fourth quarter. For Japan some of the obvious culprits are the burst of the housing bubble (1992:Q1), the East-Asian / Korean crises (1997) and the Russian Financial Crisis (1998Q3). Following these events, short-term interest rates have been zero both in the U.S. and Japan. The key finding of our empirical analysis is that the two countries stayed at the ZLB for very different reasons. Japan experienced a switch of the sunspot variable s_t from the targeted-inflation regime to the deflation regime in 1999:Q2. The Japanese economy essentially stayed in the deflation regime until the end of our sample in 2013. For the U.S., on the other hand, there is no strong evidence of a switch to the deflation regime. A change in the sunspot regime means that the agents in the economy coordinated their expectations and actions based on some extraneous

¹⁵The filtered $\epsilon_{g,t}$ shocks are plotted in Figure A-4 in the Appendix.

Figure 6: 10-Year Inflation Expectations



Notes: Units are annualized percentage. Vertical lines show the quarter where interest rates fall to the ZLB in each country.

information. While this information is not directly observed by us, we will compare aspects of monetary policy in Japan and the U.S. that may have contributed to agents' expectation formation and, through the lens of our model, determined whether a regime switch occurred.

Mechanically, s_t is an exogenous process in our model and agents' decision rules and expectations about the future are indexed by s_t . Since a switch in s_t triggers changes in expectations, we can interpret the sunspot shock also as an exogenous shock to expectations. In Figure 6 we plot 10-year inflation expectations for Japan and the U.S. starting five years prior to each country's respective ZLB episode. For Japan we use the Consensus Forecasts and for the U.S. we use the results from Aruoba (2014), which are based on surveys. The vertical lines in the figure depict the start of the ZLB episode of the two countries. For the U.S., long-run inflation expectations simply do not move during or after the financial crisis and they show small fluctuations around 2.3%. For Japan, the expectations are around 2.5%

prior to the burst of the housing price bubble and they gradually decline to 0.5% by 2003. Of course the realized quarterly or annual inflation is consistently negative throughout this period as well. Thus, the evidence in Figure 6 is consistent with the interpretation that Japan experienced a shock to inflation expectations whereas the U.S. did not.

Inflation expectations are closely tied to expectations about future monetary policy. In Japan the policy rate was pushed to the ZLB in 1999, but any further action such as committing to a particular target or quantitative easing (QE) was expressly ruled out. A speech by the then-governor Hayami (1999) explains that this policy is in effect “until deflationary concerns subside” (Page 1). He then goes on to imply that rates may go up before inflation becomes positive, if the Bank of Japan decides that price stability may be at jeopardy at some future point in time. In fact, the Bank of Japan increased its policy rate in August 2000 based on inflation concerns, even though prices have been continuously falling for many quarters. He also dismisses the need for QE arguing that a cut in the interest rates achieves what QE can achieve, no more, no less. When QE was finally implemented in 2001, the policy wasn’t explained clearly and previous claims by bank officials about the perceived ineffectiveness of QE was not refuted. To sum up, as Ito and Mishkin (2006), who provide an excellent (and critical) summary of the actions taken by the Bank of Japan and the Japanese government, put it: “The Bank of Japan had a credibility problem, particularly under the Hayami Regime [1998-2003], in which the markets and the public did not expect the Bank of Japan to pursue expansionary monetary policy in the future, which would ensure that deflation would end. These mistakes in the management of expectations are a key reason why Japan found itself in a deflation that it is finding very difficult to get out of” (Page 165).

The actions of U.S. policymakers following the financial crisis of 2008 contrast greatly with the actions of the Bank of Japan. The Federal Reserve and in general policy makers in the U.S. reacted to the financial crisis very forcefully, using unconventional tools early on. By the end of 2008 as the federal funds rate target was brought to near-zero levels, several rounds of large-scale asset purchase policies were implemented to provide liquidity to the banking system and lower long-term interest rates. Moreover, the Federal Reserve

implemented a policy of “forward guidance.” Starting from the December 2008 policy announcement, the Federal Reserve made its intention of keeping the federal funds rate near zero for an extended period of time very clear. The December 2008 press release includes the following statement: “The committee anticipates that weak economic conditions are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels of the federal funds rate for some time.” The statement was strengthened by changing “some time” to “an extended period” three months later. Starting in August 2011, the Federal Reserve was even more specific, providing explicit time frames for the low rates.

Thus, a plausible interpretation of our empirical findings is the following. In the U.S. the expansionary unconventional monetary policies of the Federal Reserve kept inflation expectations anchored and prevented a switch to the deflation regime. The Bank of Japan, on the other hand, did not convince the public that it would pursue an aggressive expansionary monetary policy, which triggered an adverse shock to inflation expectations and moved the economy into the deflation regime. Ueda (2011) provides a very thorough review of the policies used in the U.S. and Japan and he concludes that “the entrenched nature of deflationary expectations, however, seems to have prevented [the zero interest rate and QE policies to increase inflation expectations on a significant scale for a sustained period]. Unfortunately, the Japanese economy seems to be trapped in an ‘equilibrium’ whereby only exogenous forces generate movements to a better equilibrium with a higher rate of inflation” (Page 20). This, of course, is precisely the point we show formally in this paper.

5.6 Policy Experiments

During their respective ZLB episodes, both Japan and the U.S. engaged in unprecedented fiscal and monetary interventions. The U.S. enacted the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) in February 2009, which consisted of various fiscal interventions, a significant part of which was government spending. Similarly, there have been numerous fiscal programs in Japan starting in 1998, some of which were explicitly aimed at dealing with various local shocks (e.g., the 2011 earthquake) or global shocks (e.g., the global financial crisis), and starting in 2010 with deflation. We provide a summary of these programs in Table A-1. All

of these policies were aimed at increasing real economic activity, increasing inflation from deflationary levels (or preventing it to go there), or both. In this section, our main goal is to demonstrate how these fiscal policies may have drastically different effects on the economy, depending on whether a shift to the deflation regime or an adverse sequence of shocks in the targeted-inflation regime keeps the economy near the ZLB.

The recent literature has emphasized that the effects of expansionary fiscal policies on output may be larger if the economy is at or near the ZLB. In the absence of the ZLB, a typical interest rate feedback rule implies that the central bank raises nominal interest rates in response to rising inflation and output caused by an increase in government spending. This monetary contraction raises the real interest rate, reduces private consumption, and overall dampens the stimulating effect of the fiscal expansion. If the economy is at the ZLB, the expansionary fiscal policy is less likely to be accompanied by a rise in interest rates because the feedback portion of the policy rule tends to predict negative interest rates. Without a rising nominal interest rate, the increase in inflation that results from the fiscal expansion reduces the real rate. In turn, current-period demand is stimulated, amplifying the positive effect on output. In fact, the decision rules depicted in Figure 2 show that when the ZLB starts to bind, the response of output to an increase in government spending is larger, and consumption goes up.¹⁶

5.6.1 Details of the Policy Experiments

Due to the nonlinearity of our DSGE model, the effect of policy interventions captured by impulse response functions depend on the initial state of the economy. Rather than conditioning on one particular time period, we average results for several periods. We distinguish

¹⁶To be clear, the typical exercise in the literature is not a standard impulse response analysis. The analysis assumes the existence of a very large impulse other than the policy impulse being considered that affects the economy and causes the ZLB to bind. This shock is assumed to be large enough so that even after the policy impulse, which would have increased the nominal interest rate, the ZLB continues to bind. As an example, Fernández-Villaverde, Gordon, Guerrón-Quintana, and Rubio-Ramírez (2012) uses an eight-standard-deviation shock to the discount factor to keep the economy at the ZLB.

between ZLB periods (2009:Q1 to 2011:Q1 for the U.S. and 1999:Q2 to 2005:Q2 for Japan) and non-ZLB periods (1984:Q1 to 2005:Q2 for the U.S. and 1981:Q2 to 1991:Q2 for Japan).

The policy effect for a particular quarter is computed as follows. Suppose that we condition on the state of the economy in period $t-1$ and track the economy for H periods. First we compute $\mathbb{P}[s_{t+h} = 1 | D_{1:t+h}]$, where $D_{1:t+h}$ denotes the sequence of observations d_1, \dots, d_{t+h} for $h = 0, 1, \dots, H$. If this probability exceeds 10% we set $\tilde{s}_{t+h} = 1$; otherwise we set $\tilde{s}_{t+h} = 0$. Second, we compute an estimate of the remaining states: $\tilde{x}_{t-1} = \mathbb{E}[x_{t-1} | \tilde{s}_t, D_{1:t}]$ as well as estimates of the shocks $\tilde{\epsilon}_{i,t+h} = \mathbb{E}[\epsilon_{i,t+h} | \tilde{s}_{t:t+h}, D_{1:t+h}]$ for $i = g, r, z$. Third, we compute the non-intervention path by iterating the state-transition equations forward based on the filtered shocks $\tilde{\epsilon}_{i,t+h}$. By construction, the non-intervention path reproduces the actual data. Fourth, we generate the intervention paths for consumption, output, inflation and interest rates (signified by an I superscript) by setting $\epsilon_{g,t}^I = \tilde{\epsilon}_{g,t} + f$ (f represents the size of the fiscal intervention), $\epsilon_{r,t}^I = \tilde{\epsilon}_{r,t}$, $\epsilon_{z,t}^I = \tilde{\epsilon}_{z,t}$, and $\epsilon_{i,t+h}^I = \tilde{\epsilon}_{i,t+h}$ for $i = g, r, z$ and $h > 0$ and iterating the state-transition equation forward based on the $\epsilon_{i,t+h}^I$'s. We also compute cumulative government spending multipliers for the first H periods following the intervention:

$$\mu_H = \frac{\sum_{h=0}^H (Y_{t+h}^I - Y_{t+h})}{\sum_{h=0}^H (G_{t+h}^I - G_{t+h})}. \quad (26)$$

Note that according to our timing convention $H = 0$ corresponds to the multiplier upon impact of the shock.

After conducting the same policy intervention for every period t in the ZLB (non-ZLB) period, we record the median and various percentiles of the government spending multiplier and the difference between the paths with and without the intervention. For the ZLB period this methodology conditions on the economy being at the ZLB, integrating out the conditions that cause the economy to stay at the ZLB.

We consider two policy experiments, beginning with a pure fiscal expansion where g increases by $1.5\sigma_g$. This is a reasonably large intervention, which is also in line with the actual policy interventions in these countries.¹⁷ The second experiment couples the same

¹⁷For example, when we looked at the funding for federal contracts, grants, and loans portion of ARRA as disbursed in the first two quarters of the program, which amounts to just over 1% of GDP, this is equivalent

fiscal intervention with a commitment by the central bank to keep interest rates at or near the ZLB. This central bank intervention is implemented using a sequence of unanticipated monetary policy shocks $\epsilon_{R,t}$.¹⁸ To avoid implausibly large interventions, we choose these shocks such that they are no larger than two standard deviations in absolute value, and the interest-rate intervention is no larger than one percentage point in annualized terms in any quarter. Thus, we implicitly assume that the central bank would renege on a policy to keep interest rates near zero for an extended period of time in states of the world in which output growth and/or inflation turn out to be high. For each experiment, we report the paths of key variables following the policy interventions, as well as cumulative government spending multiplier. Appendix D.2 provides some more details.


5.6.2 Pure Fiscal Policy Intervention

The impulse responses for the fiscal-only policy intervention for the U.S. is presented in Figure 7 and the multipliers for all policy experiments are summarized in Table 2. In each panel of Figure 7 the blue line indicates the response of the economy during non-ZLB periods and the red line shows the response of the economy during the ZLB periods. Recall that in the U.S. the ZLB is reached within the targeted-inflation regime by large adverse demand shocks. Even though these shocks lie far in the tails of the ergodic distribution, the response of the economy in the ZLB period closely resembles the response during non-ZLB periods, which in turn is the “standard” response to a government spending shock in a New Keynesian DSGE model: on impact output goes up by slightly less than 0.5% and inflation increases by about 25 basis points. As a result, the central bank raises the nominal interest rate by over 75 basis points, which means roughly a 50 basis point increase in the real interest rate. This reduces consumption by over 0.35%, which is the standard crowding-out effect of government spending. All of these changes yield a fiscal multiplier of 0.62 on impact, which goes up to

to a g shock of size $1.4\sigma_g$. Table A-1 also shows that there were sizable fiscal programs in Japan, some of which were upwards of 3% of GDP.

¹⁸A detailed discussion about the advantages and disadvantages of using unanticipated versus anticipated monetary policy shocks to generate predictions conditional on an interest rate path is provided in Del Negro and Schorfheide (2012).

Figure 7: Fiscal-Only Intervention - U.S.



Notes: The blue line shows the pointwise median response of the economy in “normal” times and the red line shows the pointwise median response of the economy in the ZLB period. See Section 5.6.1 for the definitions. The interest and inflation rates are annualized. The bottom panels show the percentage change in the level of consumption and output.

0.70 at the end of three years.

In light of the results reported in the literature on government spending multipliers during ZLB episodes it may be surprising that our impulse responses during non-ZLB and ZLB periods depicted in Figure 7 are so similar. The reason for the similarity is that despite being at the ZLB prior to the impact of the shock, the economy leaves the ZLB as soon as the shock hits, because we do not keep the economy at the ZLB through another concurrent

Table 2: Cumulative Fiscal Multipliers

H	U.S.				Japan			
	0	3	7	11	0	3	7	11
Ergodic Distribution								
Fiscal	0.62	0.67	0.68	0.70	0.58	0.56	0.56	0.56
ZLB Episode								
Fiscal	0.62	0.67	0.69	0.70	0.47	0.46	0.46	0.46
Fiscal and Monetary	1.16	1.23	1.25	1.24	0.47	0.46	0.46	0.46

Note: The multiplier is defined in (26).


shock.¹⁹ As soon as the economy exits the ZLB, the additional channel that boosts the output response through the reduction of the real interest rate is absent. A second reason for the relatively small multiplier is the Frisch labor supply elasticity of $\eta = 0.85$. The multiplier is increasing in η and almost reaches one if $\eta = \infty$, i.e., preferences are quasi linear.²⁰

For Japan a very different picture emerges. Results are presented in Figure 8. As we discussed in Section 5.4, Japan remains at the deflationary regime ($s_t = 0$) throughout the ZLB period and thus behaves very differently relative to the non-ZLB period. In particular, as a result of the fiscal intervention, the inflation rate falls sharply by 100 basis points in the ZLB period, while it increases, as the conventional wisdom would suggest, during non-ZLB periods. This decline in inflation is large enough to wipe out any desire for the central bank to increase the interest rate and thus the economy stays at the ZLB. A constant interest rate along with a decline in inflation increases the real interest rate and this depresses

¹⁹When Fernández-Villaverde, Gordon, Guerrón-Quintana, and Rubio-Ramírez (2012) conduct a similar exercise without forcing the ZLB, they get a multiplier around 0.5. See footnote 16 for further details.

²⁰Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2011) obtains multipliers larger than one even away from the ZLB when they use a utility function where consumption and leisure are close complements so that when employment increases in response to a government spending shock, so does consumption.

Figure 8: Fiscal-Only Intervention - Japan



Notes: The blue line shows the pointwise median response of the economy in “normal” times and the red line shows the pointwise median response of the economy in the ZLB period. The shaded areas are the upper and lower 20% percentiles of the distribution of responses. See Section 5.6.1 for the definitions. The interest and inflation rates are annualized. The bottom panels show the percentage change in the level of consumption and output.

consumption further. Note that this is the channel emphasized in the literature as being responsible for increasing the multiplier at the ZLB but working in exactly the opposite direction since inflation falls. At the end, output still goes up as a result of this intervention but the increase is reduced by about 0.15%, which is almost a fifth of the response during the non-ZLB periods. In terms of multipliers, the impact multiplier in normal times is 0.58 and it is 0.47 in the ZLB period.

5.6.3 Combined Fiscal and Monetary Policy Intervention


We now combine the fiscal intervention with the promise of the central bank to keep rates at or near the ZLB. We only consider the ZLB period for this exercise since in “normal” times the interest rate is far from the ZLB and an expansionary monetary policy that pushes the interest rate all the way to zero would be unrealistic. In Japan the interest rate remains zero after the fiscal-only intervention, thus we consider the combined fiscal and monetary policy only for the U.S. The results are reported in Figure 9.

In all of the twelve quarters under consideration, the central bank manages to pull the interest rate all the way to the ZLB, despite the increasing urge not to do so due to higher inflation and output responses. As a result, the output response exactly doubles to almost 1%, a large fraction of which comes from the smaller decline in consumption, since the channel through the real interest rate is in effect. The impact multiplier increases by 87% and after three years the multiplier is still 77% larger. All of this shows that, unlike Japan which is in the deflationary regime, when the economy is at the ZLB because of adverse demand shocks while at the targeted-inflation regime, the monetary stimulus we consider provides a very large additional boost to the fiscal intervention. In this regard, our empirical findings are consistent with earlier results reported in the literature. However, our interpretation is different. The reason that the fiscal intervention has a large effect is because an expansionary monetary policy keeps interest rates at zero. This interpretation is consistent with the filtered monetary policy shocks shown in Appendix H.5. On average, these shocks have been negative after 2009, meaning that from an ex-post perspective, monetary policy, through the lens of our model, has been expansionary in the aftermath of the Great Recession.

6 Conclusion

We solve a small-scale New Keynesian DSGE model with the ZLB constraint and Markov sunspot shocks that can move the economy between a targeted-inflation regime and a deflation regime. An economy may stay at or near the ZLB either by successive exogenous shocks (e.g. adverse demand or technology shocks or expansionary monetary policy shocks)

Figure 9: Combined Fiscal and Monetary Intervention at the ZLB - U.S.



Notes: The purple line shows the pointwise median response of the economy to the fiscal-only intervention (the red in Figure 7 and the green line shows the pointwise median response of the economy to the combined intervention. The shaded areas are the upper and lower 20% percentiles of the distribution of responses. The interest and inflation rates are annualized. The bottom panels show the percentage change in the level of consumption and output.

in the former regime or by a regime switch to the latter. We develop a framework that can distinguish these two possibilities and apply it to the ZLB episode of the U.S. since 2008 and Japan since late 1990s. According to our estimation results, the U.S. and Japanese experiences were markedly different. Adverse demand shocks have moved the U.S. economy to the ZLB in 2009 and, subsequently, an expansive monetary policy has kept interest rates close to zero. In contrast, the Japanese economy stayed at the ZLB by a switch to the

deflation regime in 1999. While both economies were affected by adverse demand shocks that pushed them to the ZLB, we argue that the U.S. economy did not experience a regime switch due to the strong and committed response of the Federal Reserve that coordinated private inflation expectations near its target. The Bank of Japan, on the other hand, was unable to coordinate expectations, perhaps due to its weak reaction to the adverse shocks early on, and the regime switch took place.

The U.S. and Japan's experiences of moving to the ZLB have drastically different policy implications. Fiscal multipliers are about 20% smaller in the deflationary regime, despite the economy remaining at the ZLB. While a commitment by the central bank to keep rates near the ZLB doubles the fiscal multipliers in the targeted-inflation regime (U.S.), it has no effect in the deflation regime (Japan). Moreover, our results show that Japan experienced persistent deflation because of the switch to the deflationary regime and this may explain why numerous fiscal policies enacted in Japan in the last 15 years were not able generate positive inflation.

Solving for the sunspot equilibrium is computationally challenging. We leave extensions to larger DSGE models and equilibria in which the regime shifts are triggered by fundamental shocks to future research. The latter will be important in formalizing the idea we explored in this paper where central bank's actions other than their interest rate decisions may help coordinate private expectations and induce a switch in regimes. Finally, in future work we plan to conduct a normative analysis in the sunspot equilibrium.

References

- AN, S., AND F. SCHORFHEIDE (2007): "Bayesian Analysis of DSGE Models," *Econometric Reviews*, 26(2-4), 113–172.
- ANDRIEU, C., A. DOUCET, AND R. HOLENSTEIN (2010): "Particle Markov Chain Monte Carlo Methods," *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series B*, 72(3), 269–342.
- ARMENTER, R. (2014): "The Perils of Nominal Targets," *Manuscript, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia*.

ARUOBA, S. BORAGAN, L. B., AND F. SCHORFHEIDE (2013): “Assessing DSGE Model Nonlinearities,” Manuscript, University of Maryland and University of Pennsylvania.

ARUOBA, S. B. (2014): “A Survey-Based Term Structure of Inflation Expectations,” Manuscript, University of Maryland.

ARUOBA, S. B., AND F. SCHORFHEIDE (2011): “Sticky Prices versus Monetary Frictions: An Estimation of Policy Trade-Offs,” *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics*, 3(1), 60–90.

BENHABIB, J., S. SCHMITT-GROHÉ, AND M. URIBE (2001a): “Monetary Policy and Multiple Equilibria,” *The American Economic Review*, 91(1), 167–186.

BENHABIB, J., S. SCHMITT-GROHÉ, AND M. URIBE (2001b): “The Perils of Taylor Rules,” *Journal of Economic Theory*, 96, 40–69.

BRAUN, R. A., L. M. KÖRBER, AND Y. WAKI (2012): “Some Unpleasant Properties of Log-Linearized Solutions When the Nominal Rate Is Zero,” *Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Working Paper Series*.

BULLARD, J. (2010): “Seven Faces of ‘The Peril’,” *Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review*, 92(5), 339–352.

CASS, D., AND K. SHELL (1983): “Do Sunspots Matter?,” *Journal of Political Economy*, 91(2), 193–227.

CHRISTIANO, L., M. EICHENBAUM, AND S. REBELO (2011): “When Is the Government Spending Multiplier Large?,” *Journal of Political Economy*, 119(1), 78–121.

COCHRANE, J. (2013): “The New-Keynesian Liquidity Trap,” Manuscript, Chicago Booth School of Business.

CREAL, D. (2012): “A Survey of Sequential Monte Carlo Methods for Economics and Finance,” *Econometric Reviews*, 31(3), 245–296.

- DEL NEGRO, M., AND F. SCHORFHEIDE (2012): “DSGE Model Based Forecasting,” in *Handbook of Economic Forecasting*, ed. by G. Elliot, and A. Timmermann, vol. 2, p. forthcoming. Elsevier.
- EGGERTSSON, G. B. (2009): “What Fiscal Policy Is Effective at Zero Interest Rates?,” *Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports*, no. 402, 402.
- EGGERTSSON, G. B., AND M. WOODFORD (2003): “The Zero Bound on Interest Rates and Optimal Monetary Policy,” *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity*, 2003(1), 139–211.
- FERNÁNDEZ-VILLAYERDE, J., G. GORDON, P. GUERRÓN-QUINTANA, AND J. F. RUBIO-RAMÍREZ (2012): “Nonlinear Adventures at the Zero Lower Bound,” *National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper*.
- FERNÁNDEZ-VILLAYERDE, J., AND J. F. RUBIO-RAMÍREZ (2007): “Estimating Macroeconomic Models: A Likelihood Approach,” *Review of Economic Studies*, 74(4), 1059–1087.
- FUJIWARA, I., Y. HIROSE, AND M. SHINTANI (2011): “Can News Be a Major Source of Aggregate Fluctuations? A Bayesian DSGE Approach,” *Journal of Money, Credit and Banking*, 43(1), 1–29.
- GUST, C., D. LOPEZ-SALIDO, AND M. E. SMITH (2012): “The Empirical Implications of the Interest-Rate Lower Bound,” *Manuscript, Federal Reserve Board*.
- HAYAMI, M. (1999): “Mr. Hayami Discusses the Bank of Japan’s Thinking Behind the Current Zero Interest Rate Policy,” <http://www.bis.org/review/r990708a.pdf>, Accessed June 1, 2014.
- HURSEY, T., AND A. L. WOLMAN (2010): “Monetary Policy and Global Equilibria in a Production Economy,” *Economic Quarterly*, 96(4), 317–337.
- ICHIUE, H., T. KUROZUMI, AND T. SUNAKAWA (2013): “Inflation Dynamics And Labor Market Specifications: A Bayesian Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Approach For Japan’S Economy,” *Economic Inquiry*, 51(1), 273–287.

- IRELAND, P. N. (2004): “Money’s Role in the Monetary Business Cycle,” *Journal of Money, Credit and Banking*, 36(6), 969–983.
- ITO, T., AND F. S. MISHKIN (2006): “Two Decades of Japanese Monetary Policy and the Deflation Problem,” in *Monetary Policy under Very Low Inflation in the Pacific Rim*, ed. by T. Ito, and A. Rose, vol. NBER-EASE, Volume 15, pp. 131–202. University of Chicago Press.
- JUDD, K., L. MALIAR, AND S. MALIAR (2010): “A Cluster-Grid Projection Method: Solving Problems with High Dimensionality,” *NBER Working Paper*, 15965.
- JUDD, K. L. (1992): “Projection Methods for Solving Aggregate Growth Models,” *Journal of Economic Theory*, 58(2), 410 – 452.
- KITAGAWA, G. (1996): “Monte Carlo Filter and Smoother for Non-Gaussian Nonlinear State Space Models,” *Journal of Computational & Graphical Statistics*, 5, 1–25.
- KRUEGER, D., AND F. KUBLER (2004): “Computing Equilibrium in OLG Models with Production,” *Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control*, 28, 1411–1436.
- KURODA, S., AND I. YAMAMOTO (2008): “Estimating The Frisch Labor Supply Elasticity in Japan,” *Journal of the Japanese and International Economies*, 22(4), 566–585.
- LUBIK, T. A., AND F. SCHORFHEIDE (2004): “Testing for Indeterminacy: An Application to U.S. Monetary Policy,” *American Economic Review*, 94(1), 190–217.
- MALIAR, L., AND S. MALIAR (2014): “Merging Simulation and Projection Approaches to Solve High-Dimensional Problems with an Application to a New Keynesian Model,” *Quantitative Economics*, forthcoming.
- MERTENS, K., AND M. O. RAVN (2014): “Fiscal Policy in an Expectations Driven Liquidity Trap,” *Review of Economic Studies*, forthcoming.
- PITT, M., AND N. SHEPHARD (1999): “Filtering via Simulation: Auxiliary Particle Filters,” *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 94, 590–599.

RÍOS-RULL, J.-V., F. SCHORFHEIDE, C. FUENTES-ALBERO, M. KRYSHKO, AND R. SANTAELIALIA-LLOPIS (2012): “Methods versus Substance: Measuring the Effects of Technology Shocks,” *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 59(8), 826–846.

SCHMITT-GROHÉ, S., AND M. URIBE (2012): “The Making of a Great Contraction With a Liquidity Trap and a Jobless Recovery,” *Manuscript, Columbia University*.

SCHORFHEIDE, F. (2008): “DSGE Model-Based Estimation of the New Keynesian Phillips Curve,” *Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly*, Fall Issue, 397–433.

SUGO, T., AND K. UEDA (2008): “Estimating a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Model for Japan,” *Journal of the Japanese and International Economies*, 22, 476–502.

UEDA, K. (2011): “The Effective of Non-Traditional Monetary Policy Measures: The Case of the Bank of Japan,” *CARF Working Paper*, F-252.

WOODFORD, M. (2003): *Interest and Prices*. Princeton University Press.

Online Appendix to “Macroeconomic Dynamics Near the ZLB: A Tale of Two Countries”

S. Borağan Aruoba, Pablo Cuba-Borda, and Frank Schorfheide

A Solving the Two-Equation Model of Section 2

The model is characterized by the nonlinear difference equation

$$\mathbb{E}_t[\pi_{t+1}] = \max \left\{ \frac{1}{r}, \pi_* \left(\frac{\pi_t}{\pi_*} \right)^\psi \exp[\epsilon_t] \right\}. \quad (\text{A.1})$$

We assume that $r\pi_* \geq 1$ and $\psi > 1$.

The Targeted-Inflation Equilibrium and Deflation Equilibrium. Consider a solution to (A.1) that takes the following form

$$\pi_t = \pi_* \gamma \exp[\lambda \epsilon_t]. \quad (\text{A.2})$$

We now determine values of γ and λ such that (A.1) is satisfied. We begin by calculating the following expectation

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E}_t[\pi_{t+1}] &= \pi_* \gamma \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi\sigma^2}} \int \exp[\lambda\epsilon] \exp\left[-\frac{1}{2\sigma^2}\epsilon^2\right] d\epsilon \\ &= \pi_* \gamma \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi\sigma^2}} \exp\left[\frac{1}{2}\lambda^2\sigma^2\right] \int \exp\left[-\frac{1}{2\sigma^2}(\epsilon - \lambda\sigma^2)^2\right] d\epsilon \\ &= \pi_* \gamma \exp\left[\frac{1}{2}\lambda^2\sigma^2\right]. \end{aligned}$$

Combining this expression with (A.1) yields

$$\gamma \exp[\lambda^2\sigma^2/2] = \max \left\{ \frac{1}{r\pi_*}, \gamma^\psi \exp[(\psi\lambda + 1)\epsilon_t] \right\}. \quad (\text{A.3})$$

By choosing $\lambda = -1/\psi$, we ensure that the right-hand side of (A.3) is always constant. Thus, (A.3) reduces to

$$\gamma \exp[\sigma^2/(2\psi^2)] = \max \left\{ \frac{1}{r\pi_*}, \gamma^\psi \right\} \quad (\text{A.4})$$

Depending on whether the nominal interest rate is at the ZLB ($R_t = 1$) or not, we obtain two solutions for γ by equating the left-hand-side of (A.4) with either the first or the second term in the max operator:

$$\gamma_D = \frac{1}{r\pi_*} \exp\left[-\frac{\sigma^2}{2\psi^2}\right] \quad \text{and} \quad \gamma_* = \exp\left[\frac{\sigma^2}{2(\psi-1)\psi^2}\right]. \quad (\text{A.5})$$

The derivation is completed by noting that

$$\begin{aligned} \gamma_D^\psi &= \frac{1}{r\pi_*} \exp\left[-\frac{\sigma^2}{2\psi}\right] \leq \frac{1}{r\pi_*} \\ \gamma_*^\psi &= \exp\left[\frac{\sigma^2}{2(\psi-1)\psi}\right] \geq 1 \geq \frac{1}{r\pi_*}. \end{aligned}$$

A Sunspot Equilibrium. Let $s_t \in \{0, 1\}$ denote the Markov-switching sunspot process. Assume the system is in the targeted-inflation regime if $s_t = 1$ and that it is in the deflation regime if $s_t = 0$ (the 0 is used to indicate that the system is near the ZLB). The probabilities of staying in state 0 and 1, respectively, are denoted by ψ_{00} and ψ_{11} . We conjecture that the inflation dynamics follow the process

$$\pi_t^{(s)} = \pi_* \gamma(s_t) \exp[-\epsilon_t/\psi] \quad (\text{A.6})$$

In this case condition (A.4) turns into

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E}_t[\pi_{t+1}|s_t = 0]/\pi_* &= (\psi_{00}\gamma(0) + (1 - \psi_{00})\gamma(1)) \exp[\sigma^2/(2\psi^2)] = \frac{1}{r\pi_*} \\ \mathbb{E}_t[\pi_{t+1}|s_t = 1]/\pi_* &= (\psi_{11}\gamma(1) + (1 - \psi_{11})\gamma(0)) \exp[\sigma^2/(2\psi^2)] = [\gamma(1)]^\psi. \end{aligned}$$

This system of two equations can be solved for $\gamma(0)$ and $\gamma(1)$ as a function of the Markov-transition probabilities ψ_{00} and ψ_{11} . Then (A.6) is a stable solution of (A.1) provided that

$$[\gamma(0)]^\psi \leq \frac{1}{r\pi_*} \quad \text{and} \quad [\gamma(1)]^\psi \geq \frac{1}{r\pi_*}.$$

Sunspot Shock Correlated with Fundamentals. As before, let $s_t \in \{0, 1\}$ be a Markov-switching sunspot process. However, now assume that a state transition is triggered by certain realizations of the monetary policy shock ϵ_t . In particular, if $s_t = 0$, then suppose $s_{t+1} = 0$ whenever $\epsilon_{t+1} \leq \underline{\epsilon}_0$, such that

$$\psi_{00} = \Phi(\underline{\epsilon}_0),$$

where $\Phi(\cdot)$ is the cumulative density function of a $N(0, 1)$. Likewise, if $s_t = 1$, then let $s_{t+1} = 0$ whenever $\epsilon_{t+1} > \underline{\epsilon}_0$, such that

$$\psi_{11} = 1 - \Phi(\underline{\epsilon}_1).$$

To find the constants $\gamma(0)$ and $\gamma(1)$, we need to evaluate

$$\begin{aligned} & \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi\sigma^2}} \int_{-\infty}^{\underline{\epsilon}} \exp\left[-\frac{1}{2\sigma^2}(\epsilon + \sigma^2/\psi)^2\right] d\epsilon \\ &= \mathbb{P}\left\{\frac{\epsilon + \sigma^2/\psi}{\sigma} \leq \frac{\underline{\epsilon} + \sigma^2/\psi}{\sigma}\right\} = \Phi\left(\frac{\underline{\epsilon} + \sigma^2/\psi}{\sigma}\right). \end{aligned}$$

Thus, condition (A.4) turns into

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{1}{r\pi_*} &= \left[\gamma(0)\Phi(\underline{\epsilon}_0)\Phi\left(\frac{\underline{\epsilon}_0 + \sigma^2/\psi}{\sigma}\right) + \gamma(1)(1 - \Phi(\underline{\epsilon}_0))\left(1 - \Phi\left(\frac{\underline{\epsilon}_0 + \sigma^2/\psi}{\sigma}\right)\right) \right] \exp[\sigma^2/(2\psi^2)] \\ \gamma^\psi(1) &= \left[\gamma(1)(1 - \Phi(\underline{\epsilon}_1))\left(1 - \Phi\left(\frac{\underline{\epsilon}_1 + \sigma^2/\psi}{\sigma}\right)\right) + \gamma(0)\Phi(\underline{\epsilon}_1)\Phi\left(\frac{\underline{\epsilon}_1 + \sigma^2/\psi}{\sigma}\right) \right] \exp[\sigma^2/(2\psi^2)]. \end{aligned}$$

This system of two equations can be solved for $\gamma(0)$ and $\gamma(1)$ as a function of the thresholds $\underline{\epsilon}_0$ and $\underline{\epsilon}_1$. Then (A.6) is a stable solution of (A.1) provided that

$$[\gamma(0)]^\psi \leq \frac{1}{r\pi_*} \quad \text{and} \quad [\gamma(1)]^\psi \geq \frac{1}{r\pi_*}.$$

Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe (2001a) Dynamics. BSGU constructed equilibria in which the economy transitioned from the targeted-inflation equilibrium to the deflation equilibrium. Consider the following law of motion for inflation

$$\pi_t^{(BSGU)} = \pi_*\gamma_* \exp[-\epsilon_t/\psi] \exp[-\psi^{t-t_0}]. \quad (\text{A.7})$$

Here, γ_* was defined in (A.5) and $-t_0$ can be viewed as the initialization period for the inflation process. We need to verify that $\pi_t^{(BSGU)}$ satisfies (A.1). From the derivations that lead to (A.4) we deduce that

$$\gamma_*\mathbb{E}_{t+1}[\exp[-\epsilon_{t+1}/\psi]] = \gamma_*^\psi.$$

Since

$$\exp[-\psi^{t+1-t_0}] = (\exp[-\psi^{t-t_0}])^\psi,$$

we deduce that the law of motion for $\pi_t^{(BGSU)}$ in (A.7) satisfies the relationship

$$\mathbb{E}_t[\pi_{t+1}] = \pi_* \left(\frac{\pi_t}{\pi_*} \right)^\psi \exp[\epsilon_t].$$

Moreover, since $\psi > 1$, the term $\exp[-\psi^{t-t_0}\psi] \rightarrow 0$ as $t \rightarrow \infty$. Thus, the economy will move away from the targeted-inflation equilibrium and at some suitably defined t_* reach the deflation equilibrium and remain there permanently. Overall the inflation dynamics take the form

$$\pi_t = \pi_* \begin{cases} \gamma_* \exp[-\epsilon_t/\psi] \exp[-\psi^{t-t_0}] & \text{if } t \leq t_* \\ \gamma_D \exp[-\epsilon_t/\psi] & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}, \quad (\text{A.8})$$

where γ_* and γ_D were defined in (A.5).

Alternative Deflation Equilibria. Around the deflation steady state, the system is locally indeterminate. This suggests that we can construct alternative solutions to (A.1). Consider the following conjecture for inflation

$$\pi_t = \pi_* \gamma \min \left\{ \exp[-c/\psi], \exp[-\epsilon/\psi] \right\}, \quad (\text{A.9})$$

where c is a cutoff value. The intuition for this solution is the following. Large positive shocks ϵ that could push the nominal interest rate above one, are offset by downward movements in inflation. Negative shocks do not need to be offset because they push the desired gross interest rate below one, and the max operator in the policy rule keeps the interest rate at one. Formally, we can compute the expected value of inflation as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E}_t[\pi_{t+1}] &= \pi_* \gamma \left[\frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi\sigma^2}} \int_{-\infty}^c \exp[-c/\psi] \exp\left[-\frac{1}{2\sigma^2}\epsilon^2\right] d\epsilon \right. \\ &\quad \left. + \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi\sigma^2}} \int_c^\infty \exp[-\epsilon/\psi] \exp\left[-\frac{1}{2\sigma^2}\epsilon^2\right] d\epsilon \right] \\ &= \pi_* \gamma \left[\exp[-c/\psi] \Phi(c/\sigma) + \exp\left[\frac{\sigma^2}{2\psi^2}\right] \int_c^\infty \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi\sigma^2}} \exp\left[-\frac{1}{2\sigma^2}(\epsilon + \sigma^2/\psi)^2\right] d\epsilon \right] \\ &= \pi_* \gamma \left[\exp[-c/\psi] \Phi(c/\sigma) + \exp\left[\frac{\sigma^2}{2\psi^2}\right] \left(1 - \Phi\left(\frac{c}{\sigma} + \frac{\sigma}{\psi}\right) \right) \right] \end{aligned} \quad (\text{A.10})$$

Here $\Phi(\cdot)$ denotes the cdf of a standard Normal random variable. Now define

$$f(c, \psi, \sigma) = \left[\exp[-c/\psi] \Phi(c/\sigma) + \exp\left[\frac{\sigma^2}{2\psi^2}\right] \left(1 - \Phi\left(\frac{c}{\sigma} + \frac{\sigma}{\psi}\right) \right) \right].$$

Then another solution for which interest rates stay at the ZLB is given by

$$\bar{\gamma} = \frac{1}{r_* \pi_* f(c, \psi, \sigma)}$$

It can be verified that for c small enough, the condition

$$\frac{1}{r_* \pi_*} \geq \bar{\gamma}^\psi \min \left\{ \exp[-c + \epsilon], 1 \right\}$$

is satisfied.

B Equilibrium Conditions for the Model of Section 3

In this section we sketch the derivation of the equilibrium conditions presented in Section 3.

B.1 Households

The representative household solves

$$\max_{C_{t+s}, H_{t+s}, B_{t+s}} \mathbb{E}_t \left[\sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \beta^s \left(\frac{(C_{t+s}/A_{t+s})^{1-\tau} - 1}{1-\tau} - \chi_H \frac{H_{t+s}^{1+1/\eta}}{1+1/\eta} + \chi_M V \left(\frac{M_{t+s}}{P_{t+s} A_{t+s}} \right) \right) \right],$$

subject to:

$$P_t C_t + T_t + B_t + M_t = P_t W_t H_t + M_{t-1} + R_{t-1} B_{t-1} + P_t D_t + P_t S C_t,$$

Consumption and bond holdings. Let $\beta^s \lambda_{t+s}$ be the Lagrange multiplier on the household budget constraint, the first-order condition with respect to consumption and bond holdings are given by:

$$\begin{aligned} P_t \lambda_t &= \left(\frac{C_t}{A_t} \right)^{-\tau} \frac{1}{A_t} \\ \lambda_t &= \beta R_t \lambda_{t+1}. \end{aligned}$$

Combining the previous definition with the bond holding first order condition we obtain the consumption Euler equation:

$$1 = \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left[\left(\frac{C_{t+1}/A_{t+1}}{C_t/A_t} \right)^{-\tau} \frac{1}{\gamma z_{t+1} \pi_{t+1}} \frac{R_t}{\pi_{t+1}} \right].$$

We define the stochastic discount factor as:

$$Q_{t+1|t} = \left(\frac{C_{t+1}/A_{t+1}}{C_t/A_t} \right)^{-\tau} \frac{A_t}{A_{t+1}} = \left(\frac{C_{t+1}/A_{t+1}}{C_t/A_t} \right)^{-\tau} \frac{1}{\gamma z_{t+1}}.$$

Labor-Leisure Choice. Taking first-order conditions with respect to H_t yields the standard intratemporal optimality condition for the allocation of labor

$$\frac{W_t}{A_t} = \chi_H \left(\frac{C_t}{A_t} \right)^\tau H_t^{1/\eta}.$$

B.2 Intermediate Goods Firms

Each intermediate good producer buys labor services $H_t(j)$ at the real wage W_t . Firms face nominal rigidities in terms of price adjustment costs and the adjustment costs expressed as a fraction of firms' real output is given by the function $\Phi_p \left(\frac{P_t(j)}{P_{t-1}(j)} \right)$. We assume that the adjustment cost function twice-continuously differentiable and weakly convex $\Phi'_p \geq 0$ and $\Phi''_p \geq 0$. The firm maximizes real profits with respect to $H_t(j)$ and $P_t(j)$:

$$\mathbb{E}_t \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \beta^s Q_{t+s|t} \left(\frac{P_{t+s}(j)}{P_{t+s}} A_{t+s} H_{t+s}(j) - \Phi_p \left(\frac{P_{t+s}(j)}{P_{t+s-1}(j)} \right) A_{t+s} H_{t+s}(j) - W_{t+s} H_{t+s}(j) \right),$$

subject to

$$A_t H_t(j) = \left(\frac{P_t(j)}{P_t} \right)^{-1/\nu} Y_t.$$

We use $\mu_{t+s} \beta^s Q_{t+s|t}$ to denote the Lagrange multiplier associated with this constraint.

Price setting decision. Setting $Q_{t|t} = 1$, the first-order condition with respect to $P_t(j)$ is given by:

$$\begin{aligned} 0 &= \frac{A_t H_t(j)}{P_t} - \Phi'_p \left(\frac{P_t(j)}{P_{t-1}(j)} \right) \frac{A_t H_t(j)}{P_{t-1}(j)} - \frac{\mu_t}{\nu} \left(\frac{P_t(j)}{P_t} \right)^{-1/\nu-1} \frac{Y_t}{P_t} \\ &\quad + \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left[Q_{t+1|t} \Phi'_p \left(\frac{P_{t+1}(j)}{P_t(j)} \right) A_{t+1} H_{t+1}(j) \frac{P_{t+1}(j)}{P_t^2(j)} \right]. \end{aligned}$$

Firms' labor demand. Taking first-order conditions with respect to $H_t(j)$ yields

$$W_t = \frac{P_t(j)}{P_t} A_t - \Phi_p \left(\frac{P_t(j)}{P_{t-1}(j)} \right) A_t - \mu_t A_t.$$

Symmetric equilibrium. We restrict attention to a symmetric equilibrium where all firms choose the same price $P_t(j) = P_t \forall j$. This assumption implies that in equilibrium all firms face identical marginal costs and demand the same amount of labor input. Combining the firms' price setting and labor demand first order conditions and in the presence of quadratic costs of price adjustment, $\Phi_p \left(\frac{P_t(j)}{P_{t-1}(j)} \right) = \frac{\phi}{2} \left(\frac{P_t(j)}{P_{t-1}(j)} - \bar{\pi} \right)^2$, we obtain:

$$(1 - \nu) - \chi_H \left(\frac{C_t}{A_t} \right)^\tau H_t^{1/\eta} - \frac{\phi}{2} \left(\frac{P_t}{P_{t-1} - \bar{\pi}} \right) + \nu \phi \left(\frac{P_t}{P_{t-1}} - \bar{\pi} \right) \frac{P_t}{P_{t-1}} = \nu \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left[Q_{t+1|t} \frac{P_{t+1}}{P_t} \Phi'_p \left(\frac{P_{t+1}}{P_t} \right) \frac{Y_{t+1}}{Y_t} \right].$$

B.3 Equilibrium Conditions

The technology process introduces a long-run trend in the variables of the model. To make the model stationary we use the following transformations: $y_t = Y_t/A_t$, $c_t = C_t/A_t$, and note that $Y_t/Y_{t-1} = \frac{y_t}{y_{t-1}} \gamma z_t$. We also define the gross inflation rate $\pi_t = P_t/P_{t-1}$. The equilibrium conditions shown in the main text follow immediately:

$$1 = \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left[\left(\frac{c_{t+1}}{c_t} \right)^{-\tau} \frac{1}{\gamma z_{t+1}} \frac{R_t}{\pi_{t+1}} \right] \quad (\text{A.11})$$

$$1 = \frac{1}{\nu} \left(1 - \chi_h c^\tau y^{1/\eta} \right) + \phi(\pi_t - \bar{\pi}) \left[\left(1 - \frac{1}{2\nu} \right) \pi_t + \frac{\bar{\pi}}{2\nu} \right] - \phi \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left[\left(\frac{c_{t+1}}{c_t} \right)^{-\tau} \frac{y_{t+1}}{y_t} (\pi_{t+1} - \bar{\pi}) \pi_{t+1} \right] \quad (\text{A.12})$$

$$c_t = \left[\frac{1}{g_t} - \frac{\phi}{2} (\pi_t - \bar{\pi})^2 \right] y_t \quad (\text{A.13})$$

$$R_t = \max \left\{ 1, \left[r \pi_* \left(\frac{\pi_t}{\pi_*} \right)^{\psi_1} \left(\frac{y_t}{y_{t-1}} z_t \right)^{\psi_2} \right]^{1-\rho_R} R_{t-1}^{\rho_R} e^{\sigma_R \epsilon_{R,t}} \right\}. \quad (\text{A.14})$$

C An Approximate Solution To a Simplified Model

In this section we will derive an approximate piece-wise linear solution for the DSGE model. Rather than constructing a sunspot equilibrium, we will focus on the targeted-inflation

equilibrium and a minimal-state-variable deflation equilibrium. The main purpose is to highlight the kink in the decision rules, which motivates the piece-wise smooth numerical approximation used for the full model. We consider the case of quasi-linear preferences with $\chi_h = 1$ and $\eta = \infty$ and will impose further restrictions below to simplify the analytical derivations. The equilibrium conditions (in terms of detrended variables, i.e., $c_t = C_t/A_t$ and $y_t = Y_t/A_t$) take the form

$$1 = \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left[\left(\frac{c_{t+1}}{c_t} \right)^{-\tau} \frac{1}{\gamma z_{t+1}} \frac{R_t}{\pi_{t+1}} \right] \quad (\text{A.15})$$

$$1 = \frac{1}{\nu} (1 - c^\tau) + \phi(\pi_t - \bar{\pi}) \left[\left(1 - \frac{1}{2\nu} \right) \pi_t + \frac{\bar{\pi}}{2\nu} \right] - \phi \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left[\left(\frac{c_{t+1}}{c_t} \right)^{-\tau} \frac{y_{t+1}}{y_t} (\pi_{t+1} - \bar{\pi}) \pi_{t+1} \right] \quad (\text{A.16})$$

$$c_t = \left[\frac{1}{g_t} - \frac{\phi}{2} (\pi_t - \bar{\pi})^2 \right] y_t \quad (\text{A.17})$$

$$R_t = \max \left\{ 1, \left[r \pi_* \left(\frac{\pi_t}{\pi_*} \right)^{\psi_1} \left(\frac{y_t}{y_{t-1}} z_t \right)^{\psi_2} \right]^{1-\rho_R} R_{t-1}^{\rho_R} e^{\sigma_R \epsilon_{R,t}} \right\}. \quad (\text{A.18})$$

C.1 Approximation of Targeted-Inflation Equilibrium

Steady State. Steady-state inflation equals π_* . Let $\lambda = \nu(1 - \beta)$, then

$$\begin{aligned} r &= \gamma/\beta \\ R_* &= r\pi_* \\ c_* &= \left[1 - v - \frac{\phi}{2} (1 - 2\lambda) \left(\pi_* - \frac{1 - \lambda}{1 - 2\lambda} \bar{\pi} \right)^2 + \frac{\phi}{2} \frac{\lambda^2}{1 - 2\lambda} \bar{\pi}^2 \right]^{1/\tau} \\ y_* &= \frac{c_*}{\left[\frac{1}{g_*} - \frac{\phi}{2} (\pi_* - \bar{\pi})^2 \right]}. \end{aligned}$$

Log-Linearization. We omit the hats from variables that capture deviations from the targeted-inflation steady state. The linearized consumption Euler equation (A.15) is

$$c_t = \mathbb{E}_t[c_{t+1}] - \frac{1}{\tau} (R_t - \mathbb{E}_t[\pi_{t+1} + z_{t+1}]).$$

The price setting equation (A.16) takes the form

$$0 = -\frac{\tau c_*^\tau}{\nu} c_t + \phi \pi_* \left[\left(1 - \frac{1}{2\nu}\right) \pi_* + \frac{\bar{\pi}}{2\nu} \right] \pi_t + \phi \pi_* (\pi_* - \bar{\pi}) \left(1 - \frac{1}{2\nu}\right) \pi_t \\ - \phi \beta \pi_* (\pi_* - \bar{\pi}) \left(\tau c_t - y_t - \mathbb{E}_t[\tau c_{t+1} - y_{t+1}] + \mathbb{E}_t[\pi_{t+1}] \right) - \phi \beta \pi_*^2 \mathbb{E}_t[\pi_{t+1}].$$

Log-linearizing the aggregate resource constraint (A.16) yields

$$c_t = y_t - \frac{1/g_*}{1/g_* - \phi(\pi_* - \bar{\pi})^2} g_t - \frac{\phi \pi_* (\pi_* - \bar{\pi})}{1/g_* - \phi(\pi_* - \bar{\pi})^2} \pi_t$$

Finally, the monetary policy rule becomes

$$R_t = \max \left\{ -\ln(r\pi_*), (1 - \rho_R)\psi_1\pi_t + (1 - \rho_R)\psi_2(y_t - y_{t-1} + z_t) + \rho R_{t-1} + \sigma_R \epsilon_{R,t} \right\}.$$

Approximate Piecewise-Linear Solution in Special Case. To simplify the exposition, we impose the following restrictions on the DSGE model parameters: $\tau = 1$, $\gamma = 1$, $\bar{\pi} = \pi_*$, $\psi_1 = \psi$, $\psi_2 = 0$, $\rho_R = 0$, $\rho_z = 0$, and $\rho_g = 0$. We obtain the system

$$\begin{aligned} R_t &= \max \left\{ -\ln(r\pi_*), \psi \pi_t + \sigma_R \epsilon_{R,t} \right\} \\ c_t &= \mathbb{E}_t[c_{t+1}] - (R_t - \mathbb{E}_t[\pi_{t+1}]) \\ \pi_t &= \beta \mathbb{E}_t[\pi_{t+1}] + \kappa c_t. \end{aligned} \tag{A.19}$$

It is well known that if the shocks are small enough such that the ZLB is non-binding, the linearized system has a unique stable solution for $\psi > 1$. Since the exogenous shocks are *iid* and the simplified system has no endogenous propagation mechanism, consumption, output, inflation, and interest rates will also be *iid* and can be expressed as a function of $\epsilon_{R,t}$. In turn, the conditional expectations of inflation and consumption equal their unconditional means, which we denote by μ_π and μ_c , respectively.

The Euler equation in (A.19) simplifies to the static relationship

$$c_t = -R_t + \mu_c + \mu_\pi. \tag{A.20}$$

Similarly, the Phillips curve in (A.19) becomes

$$\pi_t = \kappa c_t + \beta \mu_\pi. \tag{A.21}$$

Combining (A.20) and (A.21) yields

$$\pi_t = -\kappa R_t + (\kappa + \beta)\mu_\pi + \kappa\mu_c. \quad (\text{A.22})$$

We now can use (A.22) to eliminate inflation from the monetary policy rule:

$$R_t = \max \left\{ -\ln(r\pi_*), -\kappa\psi R_t + (\kappa + \beta)\psi\mu_\pi + \kappa\psi\mu_c + \sigma_R\epsilon_{R,t} \right\} \quad (\text{A.23})$$

Define

$$R_t^{(1)} = -\ln(r\pi_*) \quad \text{and} \quad R_t^{(2)} = \frac{1}{1 + \kappa\psi} \left[(\kappa + \beta)\psi\mu_\pi + \kappa\psi\mu_c + \sigma_R\epsilon_{R,t} \right].$$

Let $\bar{\epsilon}_{R,t}$ be the value of the monetary policy shock for which $R_t = -\ln(r\pi_*)$ and the two terms in the max operator of (A.23) are equal

$$\sigma_R\bar{\epsilon}_{R,t} = -(1 + \kappa\psi) \ln(r\pi_*) - (\kappa + \beta)\psi\mu_\pi - \kappa\psi\mu_c.$$

To complete the derivation of the equilibrium interest rate, it is useful to distinguish the following two cases. Case (i): suppose that $\epsilon_{R,t} < \bar{\epsilon}_{R,t}$. We will verify that $R_t = R_t^{(1)}$ is consistent with (A.23). If the monetary policy shock is less than the threshold value, then

$$(\kappa + \beta)\psi\mu_\pi + \kappa\psi\mu_c + \sigma_R\bar{\epsilon}_{R,t} < -(1 + \kappa\psi) \ln(r\pi_*).$$

Thus,

$$-\kappa\psi R_t^{(1)} + (\kappa + \beta)\psi\mu_\pi + \kappa\psi\mu_c + \sigma_R\epsilon_{R,t} < -\kappa\psi R_t^{(1)} - (1 + \kappa\psi) \ln(r\pi_*) = -\ln(r\pi_*),$$

which confirms that (A.23) is satisfied.

Case (ii): suppose that $\epsilon_{R,t} > \bar{\epsilon}_{R,t}$. We will verify that $R_t = R_t^{(2)}$ is consistent with (A.23). If the monetary policy shock is greater than the threshold value, then

$$(\kappa + \beta)\psi\mu_\pi + \kappa\psi\mu_c + \sigma_R\bar{\epsilon}_{R,t} > -(1 + \kappa\psi) \ln(r\pi_*).$$

In turn,

$$\begin{aligned} & -\kappa\psi R_t^{(2)} + (\kappa + \beta)\psi\mu_\pi + \kappa\psi\mu_c + \sigma_R\epsilon_{R,t} \\ &= -\frac{\kappa\psi}{1 + \kappa\psi} \left[(\kappa + \beta)\psi\mu_\pi + \kappa\psi\mu_c + \sigma_R\epsilon_{R,t} \right] + (\kappa + \beta)\psi\mu_\pi + \kappa\psi\mu_c + \sigma_R\epsilon_{R,t} \\ &= \frac{1}{1 + \kappa\psi} \left[(\kappa + \beta)\psi\mu_\pi + \kappa\psi\mu_c + \sigma_R\epsilon_{R,t} \right] \\ &> -\ln(r\pi_*), \end{aligned}$$

which confirms that (A.23) is satisfied.

We can now deduce that

$$R_t(\epsilon_{R,t}) = \max \left\{ -\ln(r\pi_*), \frac{1}{1+\kappa\psi} \left[\psi(\kappa+\beta)\mu_\pi + \kappa\psi\mu_c + \sigma_R\epsilon_{R,t} \right] \right\}. \quad (\text{A.24})$$

Combining (A.20) and (A.24) yields equilibrium consumption

$$c_t(\epsilon_{R,t}) = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{1+\kappa\psi} \left[(1-\psi\beta)\mu_\pi + \mu_c - \sigma_R\epsilon_{R,t} \right] & \text{if } R_t \geq -\ln(r\pi_*) \\ \ln(r\pi_*) + \mu_c + \mu_\pi & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}. \quad (\text{A.25})$$

Likewise, combining (A.21) and (A.24) delivers equilibrium inflation

$$\pi_t(\epsilon_{R,t}) = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{1+\kappa\psi} \left[(\kappa+\beta)\mu_\pi + \kappa\mu_c - \kappa\sigma_R\epsilon_{R,t} \right] & \text{if } R_t \geq -\ln(r\pi_*) \\ \kappa \ln(r\pi_*) + (\kappa+\beta)\mu_\pi + \kappa\mu_c & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}. \quad (\text{A.26})$$

If $X \sim N(\mu, \sigma^2)$ and C is a truncation constant, then

$$\mathbb{E}[X|X \geq C] = \mu + \frac{\sigma\phi_N(\alpha)}{1 - \Phi_N(\alpha)},$$

where $\alpha = (C - \mu)/\sigma$, $\phi_N(x)$ and $\Phi_N(\alpha)$ are the probability density function (pdf) and the cumulative density function (cdf) of a $N(0, 1)$. Define the cutoff value

$$C = -(1 + \kappa\psi) \ln(r\pi_*) - (\kappa + \beta)\psi\mu_\pi - \kappa\psi\mu_c. \quad (\text{A.27})$$

Using the definition of a cdf and the formula for the mean of a truncated normal random variable, we obtain

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{P}[\epsilon_{R,t} \geq C/\sigma_R] &= 1 - \Phi_N(C_y/\sigma_R) \\ \mathbb{E}[\epsilon_{R,t} | \epsilon_{R,t} \geq C/\sigma_R] &= \frac{\sigma_R\phi_N(C/\sigma_R)}{1 - \Phi_N(C/\sigma_R)}. \end{aligned}$$

Thus,

$$\mu_c = \frac{1 - \Phi_N(C_y/\sigma_R)}{1 + \kappa\psi} \left[(1 - \psi\beta)\mu_\pi + \mu_c \right] - \frac{\sigma_R\phi_N(C_y/\sigma_R)}{(1 + \kappa\psi)(1 - \Phi_N(C_y/\sigma_R))} \quad (\text{A.28})$$

$$\begin{aligned} \mu_\pi &= \frac{1 - \Phi_N(C_y/\sigma_R)}{1 + \kappa\psi} \left[(\kappa + \beta)\mu_\pi + \kappa\mu_c \right] - \frac{\kappa\sigma_R\phi_N(C_y/\sigma_R)}{(1 + \kappa\psi)(1 - \Phi_N(C_y/\sigma_R))} \\ &\quad + \Phi_N(C_y/\sigma_R) \left[\ln(r\pi_*) + \mu_c + \mu_\pi \right] \end{aligned} \quad (\text{A.29})$$

The constants C , μ_c , and μ_π can be obtained by solving the system of nonlinear equations composed of (A.27) to (A.29).

C.2 Approximation of Deflation Equilibrium

Steady State. As before, let $\lambda = \nu(1 - \beta)$. The steady-state nominal interest rate is $R_D = 1$, and provided that $\beta/(\gamma\pi_*) < 1$ and $\psi_1 > 1$:

$$\begin{aligned} r &= \gamma/\beta \\ \pi_D &= \beta/\gamma \\ c_D &= \left[1 - \nu - \frac{\phi}{2}(1 - 2\lambda) \left(\pi_D - \frac{1 - \lambda}{1 - 2\lambda} \bar{\pi} \right)^2 + \frac{\phi}{2} \frac{\lambda^2}{1 - 2\lambda} \bar{\pi}^2 \right]^{1/\tau} \\ y_D &= \frac{c_D}{\left[\frac{1}{g_*} - \frac{\phi}{2}(\pi_D - \bar{\pi})^2 \right]}. \end{aligned}$$

Log-Linearization. We omit the tildes from variables that capture deviations from the deflation steady state. The linearized consumption Euler equation (A.15) is

$$c_t = \mathbb{E}_t[c_{t+1}] - \frac{1}{\tau}(R_t - \mathbb{E}_t[\pi_{t+1} + z_{t+1}]).$$

The price-setting equation (A.16) takes the form

$$\begin{aligned} 0 &= -\frac{\tau c_D^\tau}{\nu} c_t + \phi\beta \left[\left(1 - \frac{1}{2\nu} \right) \beta + \frac{\bar{\pi}}{2\nu} \right] \pi_t + \phi\beta(\beta - \bar{\pi}) \left(1 - \frac{1}{2\nu} \right) \pi_t \\ &\quad - \phi\beta^2(\beta - \bar{\pi}) \left(\tau c_t - y_t - \mathbb{E}_t[\tau c_{t+1} - y_{t+1}] + \mathbb{E}_t[\pi_{t+1}] \right) - \phi\beta^3 \mathbb{E}_t[\pi_{t+1}]. \end{aligned}$$

Log-linearizing the aggregate resource constraint (A.16) yields

$$c_t = y_t - \frac{1/g_*}{1/g_* - \phi(\beta - \bar{\pi})^2} g_t - \frac{\phi\beta(\beta - \bar{\pi})}{1/g_* - \phi(\beta - \bar{\pi})^2} \pi_t$$

Finally, the monetary policy rule becomes

$$\begin{aligned} R_t &= \max \left\{ 0, -(1 - \rho_R) \ln(r\pi_*) - (1 - \rho_R) \psi_1 \ln(\pi_*/\beta) \right. \\ &\quad \left. + (1 - \rho_R) \psi_1 \pi_t + (1 - \rho_R) \psi_2 (y_t - y_{t-1} + z_t) + \rho R_{t-1} + \sigma_R \epsilon_{R,t} \right\}. \end{aligned}$$

Approximate Piecewise-Linear Solution in Special Case. As for the approximate analysis of the targeted-inflation equilibrium, we impose the following restrictions on the DSGE model parameters: $\tau = 1$, $\gamma = 1$, $\bar{\pi} = \pi_*$, $\psi_1 = \psi$, $\psi_2 = 0$, $\rho_R = 0$, $\rho_z = 0$, and

$\rho_g = 0$. In the deflation equilibrium, the steady-state inflation rate is $\pi_D = \beta$. To ease the expositions, we assume that the terms $|\pi_D - \bar{\pi}|$ that appear in the log-linearized equations above are negligible. Denote percentage deviations of a variable x_t from its deflation steady state by $\tilde{x}_t = \ln(x_t/x_D)$. If we let $\kappa_D = c_D/(\nu\phi\beta^2)$ and using the steady-state relationship $r = 1/\beta$

$$\begin{aligned}\tilde{R}_t &= \max \left\{ 0, -(\psi - 1) \ln(r\pi_*) + \psi\tilde{\pi}_t + \sigma_R\epsilon_{R,t} \right\} \\ \tilde{c}_t &= \mathbb{E}_t[\tilde{c}_{t+1}] - (\tilde{R}_t - \mathbb{E}_t[\tilde{\pi}_{t+1}]) \\ \tilde{\pi}_t &= \beta\mathbb{E}_t[\tilde{\pi}_{t+1}] + \kappa_D\tilde{c}_t.\end{aligned}\tag{A.30}$$

Provided that $\psi > 1$, the ZLB is binding with high probability if the shock standard deviation σ_R is small. In this case, $\tilde{R}_t = 0$. An equilibrium in which all variables are *iid* can be obtained by adjusting the constants in (A.24) to (A.26):

$$\begin{aligned}\tilde{R}_t(\epsilon_{R,t}) &= \max \left\{ 0, \frac{1}{1 + \kappa\psi} \left[\psi(\kappa + \beta)\mu_\pi^D + \kappa\psi\mu_c^D - (\psi - 1) \ln(r\pi_*) + \sigma_R\epsilon_{R,t} \right] \right\} \\ \tilde{c}_t(\epsilon_{R,t}) &= \begin{cases} \frac{1}{1 + \kappa\psi} \left[(1 - \psi\beta)\mu_\pi^D + \mu_c^D + (\psi - 1) \ln(r\pi_*) - \sigma_R\epsilon_{R,t} \right] & \text{if } \tilde{R}_t \geq 0 \\ \mu_c^D + \mu_\pi^D & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \\ \tilde{\pi}_t(\epsilon_{R,t}) &= \begin{cases} \frac{1}{1 + \kappa\psi} \left[(\kappa + \beta)\mu_\pi^D + \kappa\mu_c^D + \kappa(\psi - 1) \ln(r\pi_*) - \kappa\sigma_R\epsilon_{R,t} \right] & \text{if } \tilde{R}_t \geq 0 \\ (\kappa + \beta)\mu_\pi^D + \kappa\mu_c^D & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}.\end{aligned}\tag{A.31}$$

In this simple model, the decision rules have a kink at the point in the state space where the two terms in the max operator of the interest rate equation are equal to each other. In the targeted-inflation equilibrium, this point in the state space is given by

$$\bar{\epsilon}_R^* = \frac{1}{\sigma_R} \left[- (1 + \kappa\psi) \ln(r\pi_*) - (\kappa + \beta)\psi\mu_\pi^* - \kappa\psi\mu_c^* \right],$$

whereas in the deflation equilibrium, it is

$$\bar{\epsilon}_R^D = \frac{1}{\sigma_R} \left[(\psi - 1) \ln(r\pi_*) - (\kappa + \beta)\psi\mu_\pi^D - \kappa\psi\mu_c^D \right],$$

Once $\epsilon_{R,t}$ falls below the threshold value $\bar{\epsilon}_R^*$ or $\bar{\epsilon}_R^D$, its marginal effect on the endogenous variables is zero. To the extent that $\bar{\epsilon}_R^D > 0 > \bar{\epsilon}_R^*$, it takes a positive shock in the deflation equilibrium to move away from the ZLB, whereas it takes a large negative monetary shock in the targeted-inflation equilibrium to hit the ZLB.

D Computational Details

D.1 Model Solution Algorithm

Algorithm 1 (Model Solution)

1. Construct solutions for the targeted-inflation equilibrium ($s_t = 1$ with probability one) and the deflation equilibrium ($s_t = 0$ with probability one):
 - (a) Start with a guess for Θ . For the targeted-inflation equilibrium, this guess is obtained from a first-order linear approximation around the targeted-inflation steady state. For the deflation equilibrium, it is obtained by assuming constant decision rules for inflation and \mathcal{E} at the deflation steady state.
 - (b) Given this guess, simulate the model for a large number of periods. We use 10,000 simulations after a burn-in period of 150 observations.
 - (c) Use the cluster-grid algorithm in Judd, Maliar, and Maliar (2010) to obtain a collection of grid points for the model solution. For the deflation equilibrium we use the a time-separted grid instead, because this algorithm suits the behavior of this equilibrium better, since there are many periods when the economy is on the “edge” of the ergodic distribution at the ZLB. Label these grid points as $\{\mathcal{S}_1, \dots, \mathcal{S}_M\}$. For a fourth-order approximation, we use $M = 130$.
 - (d) Solve for the Θ by minimizing the sum of squared residuals using Algorithm 2.
2. Repeat steps (b)-(d) a sufficient number of times so that the ergodic distribution remains unchanged from one iteration to the next.
3. Initialize the sunspot solution decision rules for $s_t = 1$ ($s_t = 0$) with the targeted-inflation equilibrium decision rules decision rules that come from the targeted-inflation (deflation) equilibrium obtained in step 1. Given this guess, simulate the sunspot model for a large number of periods as in (b). For the sunspot model this simulation also includes the simulated path of the sunspot variable s_t .

4. Given the simulated path, obtain the grid for the state variables over which the approximation needs to be accurate. For the sunspot equilibrium, we use the same time-separated grid algorithm to deliver the grid points that represent the ergodic set. For a fourth order approximation of Japan we set $M = 624$ and obtain 50% of this points conditioning on $s_t = 1$ and the remaining are conditioned on $s_t = 0$. This oversamples points from the $s_t = 0$ regime to increase the accuracy of the solution.

For the US we obtained 268 grid points from the ergodic distribution using the cluster-grid algorithm. Again we obtain 50% of the points conditioning on $s_t = 1$ and the rest conditioning on $s_t = 0$. The remaining 356 points come from the filtered states. We use 36 filtered states corresponding to the period 2000:Q1-2008:Q4 and 320 points corresponding to filtered states using multiple particles per period from 2009:Q1-2013:Q4.

5. Solve for the Θ by minimizing the sum of squared residuals using Algorithm 2.
6. Repeat steps 2.-5. a sufficient number of times so that the ergodic distribution of the sunspot model remains unchanged from one iteration to the next. For the US sunspot equilibrium, we also iterate between solution and filtering to make sure the filtered states used in the solution grid remain unchanged.

Algorithm 2 (Determinining the Approximate Decision Rules)

1. For a generic grid point \mathcal{S}_i and the current value for Θ , compute $f_\pi^1(\mathcal{S}_i; \Theta)$, $f_\pi^2(\mathcal{S}_i; \Theta)$, $f_{\mathcal{E}}^1(\mathcal{S}_i; \Theta)$, and $f_{\mathcal{E}}^2(\mathcal{S}_i; \Theta)$.
2. Assume $\zeta_i \equiv I\{R(\mathcal{S}_i, \Theta) > 1\} = 1$ and compute π_i , and \mathcal{E}_i , as well as y_i and c_i using (19) and (21).
3. Compute R_i based on (11) using π_i and y_i obtained in (2). If R_i is greater than unity, then ζ_i is indeed equal to one. Otherwise, set $\zeta_i = 0$ (and thus $R_i = 1$) and recompute all other objects.
4. The final step is to compute the residual functions. In each regime $s_t = \{0, 1\}$ there are four residuals, corresponding to the four functions being approximated. For a

given set of state variables \mathcal{S}_i , only two of them will be relevant since we either need the constrained decision rules or the unconstrained ones. Taking into account the transition of the sunspot the residual functions will be given by

$$\mathcal{R}^1(\mathcal{S}_i) = \mathcal{E}_i - \int \int \int \int \frac{c(\mathcal{S}')^{-\tau}}{\gamma z' \pi(\mathcal{S}')} dF(z') dF(g') dF(\epsilon'_R) dF(s') \quad (\text{A.32})$$

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{R}^2(\mathcal{S}_i) &= \xi(c_i, \pi_i, y_i) \quad (\text{A.33}) \\ &- \phi \beta \int \int \int \int c(\mathcal{S}')^{-\tau} y(\mathcal{S}') [\pi(\mathcal{S}') - \bar{\pi}] \pi(\mathcal{S}') dF(z') dF(g') dF(\epsilon'_R) dF(s') \end{aligned}$$

Note that this step involves computing $\pi(\mathcal{S}')$, $y(\mathcal{S}')$, $c(\mathcal{S}')$, and $R(\mathcal{S}')$ which is done following steps (1)-(3) above for each value of \mathcal{S}' . We use a non product monomial integration rule to evaluate these integrals.

5. The objective function to be minimized is the sum of squared residuals obtained in (4).

For the target-inflation (deflation) regimes, we first solve for a second-order polynomial approximation of the decision rules and move to a third- and fourth-order polynomial using the previous order solution as initial guess. We use analytical derivatives of the objection function, which speeds up the solution by two orders of magnitude. As a measure of accuracy, we compute the approximation errors from A.32 and A.34, converted to consumption units. For the sunspot equilibrium the approximation errors are in the order of 10^{-4} or smaller.

Figures A-1 and A-2 show the solution grid for the sunspot equilibrium. For each panel, we have R_{t-1} on the x axis and one of the other state variables on the y axis. The red (blue) dots are the grid points that represent the ergodic distribution conditional on $s_t = 1$ ($s_t = 0$). For the U.S. we include filtered grid points into the construction of the grid. The yellow dots denote filtered states between 2000 to 2008; the green (turquoise) dots represent filtered states from 2009 to 2013 conditioning on $s_t = 1$ ($s_t = 0$). It is evident that for the U.S. the filtered states lie in the tails of the ergodic distribution of the sunspot equilibrium. By adding these filtered states to the grid points, we ensure that our approximation will be accurate in these low-probability regions.

Figure A-1: Solution Grid for the Targeted-Inflation Equilibrium - US





Figure A-2: Solution Grid for the Targeted-Inflation Equilibrium - Japan



D.2 Details of Policy Experiments

Algorithm 3 (Effect of Combined Fiscal and Monetary Policy Intervention)

Here we describe how we complement the fiscal policy intervention of size f with a commitment of the central bank to keep the policy rate at or near the ZLB. We use \tilde{x} to denote the mean value of x obtained from the particle filter. (See Section 5.6.1 for details.) We use $H = 11$, which means the central bank's commitment is in place for three years.

For some t in the ZLB period of U.S. or Japan, we do the following:

1. Initialize the simulation by setting $(R_{t-1}, y_{t-1}, z_{t-1}, g_{t-1}, s_t) = (\tilde{R}_{t-1}, \tilde{y}_{t-1}, \tilde{z}_{t-1}, \tilde{g}_{t-1}, \tilde{s}_t)$
2. Generate baseline trajectories based on the innovation sequence $\{\epsilon_{i,t+h}\}_{h=0}^H = \{\tilde{\epsilon}_{i,t+h}\}_{h=0}^H$ and $\{s_{t+h}\}_{h=0}^H = \{\tilde{s}_{t+h}\}_{h=0}^H$, which essentially means in the baseline trajectories all output growth, inflation and the interest rate equals their data counterparts up to a measurement error we use in filtering.
3. Generate the innovation sequence for the counterfactual trajectories according to

$$\begin{aligned}\epsilon_{g,t}^I &= f + \tilde{\epsilon}_{g,t}; & \epsilon_{g,t+h}^I &= \tilde{\epsilon}_{g,t+h} \quad \text{for } h = 1, \dots, H; \\ \epsilon_{z,t+h}^I &= \tilde{\epsilon}_{z,t+h} \quad \text{for } h = 1, \dots, H; \\ s_{t+h}^I &= \tilde{s}_{t+h}\end{aligned}$$

In periods $t+h$ for $h = 0, \dots, H$, conditional on $\epsilon_{g,t+h}^I, \epsilon_{z,t+h}^I$ and s_{t+h}^I , determine $\epsilon_{R,t+h}^I$ by solving for the smallest $\hat{\epsilon}_{R,t+h}$ such that it is less than $2\sigma_R$ in absolute value, that yields either

$$R_{t+h}^I(\epsilon_{R,t+h}^I = \hat{\epsilon}_{R,t+h}) = 1 \quad \text{or} \quad 400 \left(R_t^I(\epsilon_{R,t+h}^I = 0) - R_{t+h}^I(\epsilon_{R,t+h}^I = \hat{\epsilon}_{R,t+h}) \right) = 1.$$

4. Conditional on $(R_{t-1}, y_{t-1}, z_{t-1}, g_{t-1})$, compute $\{R_{t+h}, y_{t+h}, \pi_{t+h}\}_{h=0}^H$ and $\{R_{t+h}^I, y_{t+h}^I, \pi_{t+h}^I\}_{h=0}^H$ based on $\{\epsilon_t, s_t\}$ and $\{\epsilon_t^I, s_t^I\}$, respectively, and let

$$IRF(x_{t+h} | \epsilon_{g,t}, \epsilon_{R,t:t+h}) = \ln x_{t+h}^I - \ln x_{t+h}. \quad (\text{A.34})$$

In tables and figures we report the median and the point-wise 20% and 80% response across all possible initial period t . When we consider only a fiscal policy, we set $\epsilon_{R,t+h}^I = 0$ for $h = 0, \dots, H$ as well.

E Data

E.1 United States

For the US we collected data from the FRB St. Louis FRED database. We obtained real GDP (GDPC96) and converted into per capita terms using the Civilian Noninstitutional Population (CNP16OV). The population series is smoothed applying an eight-quarter backward-looking moving average filter. The measure of the price level is the GDP deflator (GDPDEF) and the inflation rate is computed as its log difference annualized and in percents. The interest rate is the average effective federal funds rate (FEDFUNDS) averaged over each quarter.

E.2 Japan

For Japan we collected real GDP (RGDP) from the Cabinet Office's National Accounts. We used the statistical release of benchmark year 2005 that covers the period 1994.Q1 - 2013.Q4. To extend the sample we collected RGDP figures from the benchmark year 2000 and constructed a series spanning the period 1981.Q1-2013.Q1 using the quarterly growth rate of the RGDP benchmark year 2000. Our measure of per-capita output is RGDP divided by the total population of 15 years and over. We smoothed the quarterly growth of the population series using an eight quarter backward-looking moving average filter. We obtained population data from the Statistics Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Historical data Table b-1. For the price level we use the implicit GDP deflator index from the Cabinet Office. We also extend the benchmark year 2005 release using the growth rate of the index from the benchmark year 2000 figures. For the nominal interest rate we use the Bank of Japan's uncollateralized call rate (STSTRACLUCON) from 1986:M7-2013:M12. To complete the series from 1981.M1 - 1985.M6 we use the monthly average of the collateralized overnight call rate (STSTRACLCOON). Finally the monthly figures are transformed using quarterly averages over the sample period.

E.3 Fiscal Programs in Japan

Table A-1 shows a list of fiscal programs that were in effect in Japan from 1998 to 2013. For each program we show the size of the program, and the amount paid directly by the central (national) government as a percentage of GDP and a short description. In the last three columns we show the major concerns of the government in passing each measure, focusing on concerns about real activity, exchange rate and deflation. We also provide a link to the official statement of each program.

Table A-1: Fiscal Programs in Japan

Program	Total program	National expenditure	Description	Real Economy	Exchange rate	Deflation
Apr-1998	3.12	0.90	Comprehensive economic measures to accelerate recovery http://www5.cao.go.jp/98/b/19980424b-taisaku-e.html	x		
Nov-1998	4.68	1.48	Emergency economic recovery package http://www5.cao.go.jp/98/b/19981116b-taisaku-e.html	x		
Nov-1999	3.57	1.29	Economic stimulus and revitalize economy http://www5.cao.go.jp/99/b/19991111b-taisaku-e2.html	x		
Oct-2000	2.16	0.76	Additional stimulus to consolidate economic recovery http://www5.cao.go.jp/2000/b/1019b-taisakul-e.html	x		
Dec-2001	0.81	0.51	Fear of global recession and commitment to avoid deflationary spiral http://www5.cao.go.jp/keizai1/2001/1227daijin-speech-e.pdf	x		
Dec-2002	2.97	0.60	Program to accelerate economic reform http://www5.cao.go.jp/keizai1/2002/1212program-e.pdf	x		
Aug-2008	2.33	0.36	Economic package to reduce uncertainty with respect to slowdown in global economy	x		
Oct-2008	5.37	0.96	http://www5.cao.go.jp/keizai1/2008/0918summary-english.pdf Economic measures in response of global recession http://www5.cao.go.jp/keizai1/2008/081201outline-english.pdf	x		
Apr-2009	12.06	3.27	Response to rapid deterioration of external sector and risk in financial system	x		
Dec-2009	5.18	1.53	http://www5.cao.go.jp/keizai1/2009/0420summary-english.pdf Emergency economic measures to secure economic recovery and fight deflation	x	x	x
Sep-2010	2.03	0.19	http://www5.cao.go.jp/keizai1/2009/091228_emergency_economic.pdf Economic measures to overcome deflation http://www5.cao.go.jp/keizai1/2010/2010esp2.pdf	x	x	x
Oct-2010	4.37	1.06	Additional economic measures to control currency appreciation and deflation http://www5.cao.go.jp/keizai1/2010/101008.pdf	x	x	x
Jan-2013	4.17	2.70	Post earthquake stimulus to fight currency appreciation and deflation http://www5.cao.go.jp/keizai1/2013/130111_emergency_economic_measures.pdf	x	x	x
Dec-2013	3.84	1.13	Revitalization of economy and end deflation http://www5.cao.go.jp/keizai1/2013/20131205_economic_measures_all.pdf	x	x	x

Notes: The table shows the major fiscal programs in Japan from 1998 to 2013. The second and third column shows the size of the total program and the portion spent by the central government as a percentage of GDP. The last three columns show what major concerns the policy makers had for each program. We provide the URL of the description of each program.

F DSGE Model Estimation

F.1 Estimation Sample

For Japan we restrict the estimation sample to the period 1981:Q1 to 1994:Q4. Effectively the nominal interest reached the zero lower bound in the third quarter of 1998, however we stop estimation earlier to avoid non-linearities caused by the zero lower bound. Our choice for the estimation sample is consistent with other studies that used perturbation-based techniques to estimate structural parameters for the Japanese economy, e.g. Sugo and Ueda (2008) and Fujiwara, Hirose, and Shintani (2011). For the US we estimate the model from 1984:Q1 to 2007:Q4. For a similar reason we truncate the estimation before the nominal interest rate reached the zero lower bound.

F.2 Priors for estimation

We use similar priors for both countries. For instance the prior mean for τ implies a risk-aversion coefficient of 2. We specify the prior for the price-adjustment-cost parameter ϕ indirectly through a prior for the slope κ of the New-Keynesian Phillips curve in a linearized version of the model. For both countries this prior encompasses values that imply an essentially flat as well as a fairly steep Phillips curve, with a prior mean of 0.3. The prior for the inflation response coefficient in the monetary policy rule is centered at 1.5 with a tighter prior because it was difficult to identify this parameter from the data. Finally, we use diffuse priors for the parameters associated with the exogenous shock processes. Marginal prior distributions for all DSGE model parameters are summarized in Table A-2. We assume that the parameters are *a priori* independent. Thus, the joint prior distribution is given by the product of the marginals.

F.3 Posterior Simulator

We estimate a second-order approximation of the DSGE model using the random walk Metropolis algorithm (RWM) described in An and Schorfheide (2007). To initialize the RWM

Table A-2: Priors for Estimation

Parameter	Density	US		Japan	
		Param (1)	Param (2)	Param (1)	Param (2)
τ	Gamma	2	0.25	2	0.5
κ	Gamma	0.3	0.1	0.3	0.1
ψ_1	Gamma	1.5	0.05	1.5	0.05
ρ_r	Beta	0.5	0.2	0.6	0.2
ρ_g	Beta	0.8	0.1	0.6	0.2
ρ_z	Beta	0.2	0.1	0.4	0.2
$100\sigma_r$	Inv Gamma	0.3	4.0	0.3	4.0
$100\sigma_g$	Inv Gamma	0.4	4.0	0.4	4.0
$100\sigma_z$	Inv Gamma	0.4	4.0	0.4	4.0

Notes: Para (1) and Para(2) are the mean and the standard deviations for Beta and Gamma distributions; s and ν for the Inverse Gamma distribution, where $p_{IG}(\sigma|\nu, s) \propto \sigma^{-\nu-1}e^{-\nu s^2/2\sigma^2}$.


chain we first estimate a log-linearized version of the DSGE model to obtain a covariance matrix for the proposal distribution. Using the posterior mode and the covariance matrix of the log-linearized model we then run the RWM algorithm using the particle filter to evaluate the likelihood of the non-linear model. The covariance matrix of the proposal distribution is scaled such that the RWM algorithm has an acceptance rate of approximately 50%. We use 50,000 particles to approximate the likelihood and set the variance of the measurement errors to 10% of the sample variance of the observables to help estimation. We obtain 100,000 draws of parameters from the posterior distribution. Summary statistics of the posterior distribution are based on the last 50,000 draws of the sequence.

G Impulse Responses

We show the impulse response to one standard deviation shocks in Figure A-3. The variables are in columns and the three shocks, ϵ_z , ϵ_g and ϵ_r are in rows. Since these are responses

from a nonlinear model, we need to explain how we run the experiments. We start with 100 draws from the ergodic distribution for the U.S., conditioning on $s = 0$ and $s = 1$ separately. Then using these 100 draws as initial states along with their associated s value, we compute the response of the economy to each shock relative to a baseline with no impulse. In both economies all exogenous variables evolve according to their stochastic processes and throughout the duration of the exercise the value of s remains the same. In the figure we report the point-wise median response in percentage units.

Figure A-3: Impulse Responses - U.S. Ergodic Distribution



The responses when $s = 1$ is entirely standard: a technology shock increases output and interest rates and reduces inflation, a demand shock increases all there variables and a monetary policy shock increases interest rates and reduces inflation and output. With

$s = 0$ a few significant differences emerge. First, the effect of shocks die out quicker. Second, monetary policy shocks have a very muted effect on inflation and output. Third, and most importantly, a positive government spending (demand) shock reduces inflation, as opposed to increase it as in when $s = 1$. This is because the aggregate demand curve becomes upward sloped when $s = 0$, similar to what Mertens and Ravn (2014) discuss.

H Particle Filter For Sunspot Equilibrium

The particle filter is used to extract information about the state variables of the model from data on output growth, inflation, and nominal interest rates over the periods 1984:Q1 to 2013:Q4 (U.S.) and 1981:Q1 to 2013:Q4 (Japan).

H.1 State-Space Representation

Let d_t be the 3×1 vector of observables consisting of output growth, inflation, and nominal interest rates. The vector x_t stacks the continuous state variables, which are given by $x_t = [R_t, y_t, y_{t-1}, z_t, g_t, A_t]'$ and $s_t \in \{0, 1\}$, is the Markov-switching process.

$$d_t = \Psi(x_t) + \nu_t \tag{A.35}$$

$$\mathbb{P}\{s_t = 1\} = \begin{cases} (1 - p_{00}) & \text{if } s_{t-1} = 0 \\ p_{11} & \text{if } s_{t-1} = 1 \end{cases} \tag{A.36}$$

$$x_t = F_{s_t}(x_{t-1}, \epsilon_t) \tag{A.37}$$

The first equation is the measurement equation, where $\nu_t \sim N(0, \Sigma_\nu)$ is a vector of measurement errors. The second equation represents the law of motion of the Markov-switching process. The third equation corresponds to the law of motion of the continuous state variables. The vector $\epsilon_t \sim N(0, I)$ stacks the innovations $\epsilon_{z,t}$, $\epsilon_{g,t}$, and $\epsilon_{R,t}$. The functions $F_0(\cdot)$ and $F_1(\cdot)$ are generated by the model solution procedure. We subsequently use the densities $p(d_t|x_t)$, $p(s_t|s_{t-1})$, and $p(x_t|x_{t-1}, s_t)$ to summarize the measurement and the state transition equations.

H.2 Sequential Importance Sampling Approximation

Let $w_t = [x'_t, s'_t]'$ and $D_{t_0:t_1} = \{d_{t_0}, \dots, d_{t_1}\}$. Particle filtering relies on sequential importance sampling approximations. The distribution $p(w_{t-1}|D_{1:t-1})$ is approximated by a set of pairs $\{(z_{t-1}^{(i)}, \pi_{t-1}^{(i)})\}_{i=1}^N$ in the sense that

$$\frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N f(w_{t-1}^{(i)}) \pi_{t-1}^{(i)} \xrightarrow{a.s.} \mathbb{E}[f(w_{t-1})|D_{1:t-1}], \quad (\text{A.38})$$

where $w_{t-1}^{(i)}$ is the i 'th particle, $\pi_{t-1}^{(i)}$ is its weight, and N is the number of particles. An important step in the filtering algorithm is to draw a new set of particles for period t . In general, these particles are drawn from a distribution with a density that is proportional to $g(w_t|D_{1:t}, w_{t-1}^{(i)})$, which may depend on the particle value in period $t-1$ as well as the observation d_t in period t . This procedure leads to an importance sampling approximation of the form:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E}[f(w_t)|D_{1:t}] &= \int_{w_t} f(w_t) \frac{p(d_t|w_t)p(w_t|D_{1:t-1})}{p(d_t|D_{1:t-1})} dw_t & (\text{A.39}) \\ &= \int_{w_{t-1:t}} f(w_t) \frac{p(d_t|w_t)p(w_t|w_{t-1})p(w_{t-1}|D_{1:t-1})}{p(d_t|D_{1:t-1})} dw_{t-1:t} \\ &\approx \frac{\frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N f(w_t^{(i)}) \frac{p(d_t|w_t^{(i)})p(w_t^{(i)}|w_{t-1}^{(i)})}{g(w_t^{(i)}|D_{1:t}, w_{t-1}^{(i)})} \pi_{t-1}^{(i)}}{\frac{1}{N} \sum_{j=1}^N \frac{p(d_t|w_t^{(j)})p(w_t^{(j)}|w_{t-1}^{(j)})}{g(w_t^{(j)}|D_{1:T}, w_{t-1}^{(j)})} \pi_{t-1}^{(j)}} \\ &= \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N f(w_t^{(i)}) \left(\frac{\tilde{\pi}_t^{(i)}}{\frac{1}{N} \sum_{j=1}^N \tilde{\pi}_t^{(j)}} \right) = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N f(w_t^{(i)}) \pi_t^{(i)}, \end{aligned}$$

where the unnormalized and normalized probability weights are given by

$$\tilde{\pi}_t^{(i)} = \frac{p(d_t|w_t^{(i)})p(w_t^{(i)}|w_{t-1}^{(i)})}{g(w_t^{(i)}|D_{1:T}, w_{t-1}^{(i)})} \pi_{t-1}^{(i)} \quad \text{and} \quad \pi_t^{(i)} = \frac{\tilde{\pi}_t^{(i)}}{\sum_{j=1}^N \tilde{\pi}_t^{(j)}}, \quad (\text{A.40})$$

respectively. In simple versions of the particle filter, $w_t^{(i)}$ is often generated by simulating the model forward, which means that $g(w_t^{(i)}|D_{1:T}, w_{t-1}^{(i)}) \propto p(w_t^{(i)}|w_{t-1}^{(i)})$, and the formula for the particle weights simplifies considerably. Unfortunately, this approach is quite inefficient in our application, and we require a more elaborate density $g(\cdot)$ described below that accounts for information in d_t . The resulting extension of the particle filter is known as auxiliary particle filter, e.g. Pitt and Shephard (1999).

H.3 Filtering

Initialization. To generate the initial set of particles $\{(w_0^{(i)}, \pi_0^{(i)})\}_{i=1}^N$, for each i , simulate the DSGE model for T_0 periods, starting from the targeted-inflation steady state, and set $\pi_0^{(i)} = 1$.

Sequential Importance Sampling. For $t = 1$ to T :

1. $\{w_{t-1}^{(i)}, \pi_{t-1}^{(i)}\}_{i=1}^N$ is the particle approximation of $p(w_{t-1}|D_{1:t-1})$. For $i = 1$ to N :
 - (a) Draw $w_t^{(i)}$ conditional on $w_{t-1}^{(i)}$ from $g(w_t|D_{1:t}, w_{t-1}^{(i)})$.
 - (b) Compute the unnormalized particle weights $\tilde{\pi}_t^{(i)}$ according to (A.40).
2. Compute the normalized particle weights $\pi_t^{(i)}$ and the effective sample size $ESS_t = N^2 / \sum_{i=1}^N (\pi_t^{(i)})^2$.
3. Resample the particles via deterministic resampling (see Kitagawa (1996)). Reset weights to be $\pi_t^{(i)} = 1$ and approximate $p(w_t|D_{1:t})$ by $\{(w_t^{(i)}, \pi_t^{(i)})\}_{i=1}^n$.

H.4 Tuning of the Filter

In the empirical analysis, we set $T_0 = 50$ and $N = 1,000,000$. We also fix the measurement error variance for output growth, inflation, and interest rates to be equal to 10% of the sample variance of these series. We assume that the economies are in the targeted-inflation regime during the initialization period. Since our model has discrete and continuous state variables, we write

$$p(w_t|w_{t-1}) = \begin{cases} p_0(x_t|x_{t-1}, s_t = 0)\mathbb{P}\{s_t = 0|s_{t-1}\} & \text{if } s_t = 0 \\ p_1(x_t|x_{t-1}, s_t = 1)\mathbb{P}\{s_t = 1|s_{t-1}\} & \text{if } s_t = 1 \end{cases}$$

and consider proposal densities of the form

$$q(w_t|w_{t-1}, d_t) = \begin{cases} q_0(x_t|x_{t-1}, d_t, s_t = 0)\lambda(w_{t-1}, d_t) & \text{if } s_t = 0 \\ q_1(x_t|x_{t-1}, d_t, s_t = 1)(1 - \lambda(w_{t-1}, d_t)) & \text{if } s_t = 1 \end{cases},$$

where $\lambda(x_{t-1}, d_t)$ is the probability that $s_t = 0$ under the proposal distribution. We use $q(\cdot)$ instead of $g(\cdot)$ to indicate that the densities are normalized to integrate to one.

We effectively generate draws from the proposal density through forward iteration of the state transition equation. To adapt the proposal density to the observation d_t , we draw $\epsilon_t^{(i)} \sim N(\mu^{(i)}, \Sigma^{(i)})$ instead of the model-implied $\epsilon_t \sim N(0, I)$. In slight abuse of notation (ignoring that the dimension of x_t is larger than the dimension of ϵ_t and that its distribution is singular), we can apply the change of variable formula to obtain a representation of the proposal density

$$q(x_t^{(i)} | x_{t-1}^{(i)}) = q_\epsilon(F^{-1}(x_t^{(i)} | x_{t-1}^{(i)})) \left| \frac{\partial F^{-1}(x_t^{(i)} | x_{t-1}^{(i)})}{\partial x_t} \right|$$

Using the same change-of-variable formula, we can represent

$$p(x_t^{(i)} | x_{t-1}^{(i)}) = p_\epsilon(F^{-1}(x_t^{(i)} | x_{t-1}^{(i)})) \left| \frac{\partial F^{-1}(x_t^{(i)} | x_{t-1}^{(i)})}{\partial x_t} \right|$$

By construction, the Jacobian terms cancel and the ratio that is needed to calculate the unnormalized particle weights for period t in (A.40) simplifies to

$$\tilde{\pi}_t^{(i)} = p(d_t | w_t^{(i)}) \frac{\exp \left\{ -\frac{1}{2} \epsilon_t^{(i)'} \epsilon_t^{(i)} \right\}}{|\Sigma_\epsilon^{(i)}|^{-1/2} \exp \left\{ -\frac{1}{2} (\epsilon_t^{(i)} - \mu^{(i)})' [\Sigma^{(i)}]^{-1} (\epsilon_t^{(i)} - \mu^{(i)}) \right\}} \pi_{t-1}^{(i)}.$$

The choice of μ and Σ is described below.

Let $w_{t-1|t-1}$ be a particle filter approximation of $\mathbb{E}[w_{t-1} | D_{1:t-1}]$ and define

$$\bar{\pi}_t(\epsilon_t) = p(d_t | F(w_{t-1|t-1}, \epsilon_t)) \exp \left\{ -\frac{1}{2} \epsilon_t' \epsilon_t \right\} |\Sigma_\epsilon|^{1/2} \pi_{t-1}^{(i)}.$$

We use a grid search over ϵ_t to determine a value $\bar{\epsilon}$ that maximizes this objective function and then set $\mu^{(i)} = \bar{\epsilon}$. Moreover, we let $\Sigma^{(i)} = I$. (Executing the grid search conditional on each $w_{t-1}^{(i)}$, $i = 1, \dots, N$ turned out to be too time consuming.)

H.5 Filtered Shocks

The filtered innovations are summarized in Figure A-4. The shaded area indicates time periods in which the economy is in the deflation regime. The vertical red line indicates the end of the estimation sample.

Figure A-4: Filtered Shocks

